Three Essays on Household Consumption. by AY, Judith
Department of Economics 
Three Essays on Household Consumption 
Judith Ay 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of  
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
                                               Florence, April 2008 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
Department of Economics
Three Essays on Household Consumption
Judith Ay 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of  
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Jury Members:
Prof. Jaime Alonso-Carrera, University of Vigo 
Prof. Ana Fernandes, University of Bern 
Prof. Salvador Ortigueira, EUI, supervisor 
Prof. Morten Ravn, EUI 
© 2008, Judith Ay 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or 
transmitted without prior permission of the author 
AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
European University Institute
 





After four years and some months, suddenly my time as a student is over. It has been a great
time, although I would not go as far as to say that I will miss working on my thesis. However,
I am sure that I will miss the EUI.
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Salvador Ortigueira, to whom I am very
indebted for his consistent support, advice and encouragement, as well as for his very good and
stimulating supervision. Also I am very grateful to Morten Ravn, my second supervisor, whose
questions, help and advice were highly valuable for me. In addition, I am very much obliged to
my two external examiners, Ana Fernandes and Jaime Alonso-Carrera, for their kind comments
and encouraging suggestions.
I am truly thankful to the entire Department of Economics at the EUI for everything I have
learned here and for the way in which I could learn it.
Burcu Duygan not only has helped me a lot with my own work, but also was a fantastic person
to work for during my time as research assistant at the Finance&Consumption Programme. The
same is true for Nur Ata and Alena Bicakova.
I very much would like to say `thank you' to Jessica Spataro, Lucia Vigna, Marcia Gastaldo,
Julia Valerio, Michela Pistolozzi, Thomas Bourke, Martin Legner and Francoise Thauvin, whose
friendliness and competence made Villa San Paulo and the Baddia such great places to work at
and - being an economist - practically live in.
Of course, I am greatly indebted to the DAAD for giving me the possibility to do my PhD in
Florence under conditions which I can only describe as a huge privilege. Furthermore I would
like to thank my colleagues at WSBI-ESBG for their support and encouragement during the
last stages of my PhD.
I probably could have done a PhD without my friends, but it would have been a terrible time
without their direct and indirect support, and without them enduring my PhD related outbursts
and buying me drinks. In particular: Lucy, Graciella, Eva, Fiorella, Niccolo, Nicole, Christian,
Katrin, Elvira, Clara, Aysen, Megan, Anna, Moritz, Gerben, Itai, Paahppi, thank you for mak-
ing Florence what it was for me!










1 Self-Control and Durable Goods 9
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 The concept of time-inconsistent preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 A Simple Life-cycle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 Model set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 A Simple Life-cycle Model With Durable Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Model set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 Equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.4 Results for the model with durables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.A Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.B The model without a durable good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.C The model with a durable good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2 Eat Your Pie And Have It 35
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 A life-cycle model with durable goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.1 Model set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.2 Equilibrium Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.1 Income process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.2 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
v




2.3.3 The durable good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.4 Utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.5 Interest rate and time discount rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.1 General results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.2 The e®ect of the time-inconsistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.A Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.B Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3 Children and Inequality 69
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5.1 Estimation Results of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5.2 Matching Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5.3 Results from the Matching Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.A Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81






AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
European University Institute
 




The central topic of this thesis is household consumption. The ¯rst two papers address consump-
tion in a life-cycle framework, with particular focus on the e®ect of time-inconsistent preferences
if households consume perishable goods, but also accumulate durable goods. The third paper
investigates the sensitivity of total household consumption to family size, which has implications
for life-cycle modelling, as well as for the analysis of welfare and inequality.
The common motivation behind the di®erent chapters is to show that the driving forces behind
household consumption are very complex, but not contradictory to the life-cycle hypothesis as
formulated by Friedman in 1957. The original formulation simply states that households seek
to smooth the marginal utility of consumption over time, which initially was interpreted as a
prediction that consumption pro¯les themselves should be °at.
Indeed, one of the particular criticisms towards the life-cycle model has been, that °at life-cycle
consumption pro¯les were never observed empirically. Instead data clearly show that household
consumption is low when households are young, subsequently rises and reaches its peak during
mid age, and then falls signi¯cantly as households approach retirement age.
However, the predictions of the life-cycle model are driven by some decisive features. Firstly,
it is important which assumptions are made on the income process and on income uncertainty.
While older life-cycle papers, for technical reasons, had to draw on assuming perfect foresight or
certainty equivalence, now these assumptions are no longer needed. By now a variety of di®er-
ent income processed can be modelled, from more traditional Monte Carlo simulations (Laibson,
2001) to Bayesian Learning (Guvenen, 2005), all having di®erent implications on the household's
ability - and willingness - to smooth consumption.
Secondly, the marginal utility of consumption is not only determined by the level of consump-
tion. Unless one assumes that consumption and leisure are additively separable, or that labor
supply is exogenous, the marginal utility of consumption is determined by the choice of labor
e®ort and vice versa.
Thirdly, consumption possibilities are also limited by liquidity, and especially by borrowing con-
straints. In addition, households consume not only perishable goods but also invest in housing
and other durable goods which yield a stream of services. While durable goods are depreciating
with time, even in a life-cycle context it is evident that they can be carried across periods. This
means that in each period utility does not only depend on current consumption, but also on past
investments in the durables stock, which, depending on the relationship between durable goods
3




and perishables, can signi¯cantly a®ect the predictions of the model, and also the household's
sensitivity to income risk. The most prominent example for a durable good is housing, which
not only provides shelter but also can serve as collateral for loans and alleviates liquidity and
borrowing constraints, which may change the pattern of e®ective precautionary savings in the
face of income uncertainty. For these reasons, as Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and KrÄ uger (2005) show,
including a durable good into the life-cycle model signi¯cantly contributes to replicating the
hump-shaped pattern of expenditure observed in real data.
Fourthly, household size changes over the life-cycle. This may a®ect not only the amount of
goods demanded by the household, but also household preferences over time.
Furthermore, time preferences play an important role in determining how the future is weighted
against the present, and demographics may have signi¯cant impact not only on the level of
consumption needed to reach a given level of utility, but also on intertemporal substitution.
For reasons of tractability, and given computational constraints, all these features cannot be
included at the same time into any theoretical life-cycle framework. Not only that, they also
are di±cult to capture by empirical estimation. However, the richness of the household problem
has to be kept in mind when judging the ability of the life-cycle model to replicate observed
consumption pro¯les.
Given the nature of the household problem, there also is reason and room for including elements
from behavioral economics into life-cycle analysis. Behavioral economics investigates alterna-
tives to standard formulations of individuals' preferences, and can provide explanations for cases
where observed behavior is not reconcilable with standard economic theory based on the assump-
tions of consistency and rationality. Behavioral impetus often comes from real-life observations
of individual behavior, like loss aversion shaping risk taking behavior, or like (costly) commit-
ment devices being used to guarantee adherence to plans for the future. Indeed, in the life-cycle
context, di±culties to adhere to a retirement savings plan can be a valid assumption. In mod-
elling terms this phenomenon can be captured by taking up Phelbs' and Pollak's formulation
of present-biased preferences and introducing this feature into the life-cycle model as ¯rst done
with surprising results by Laibson: A present-bias leads to time-inconsistency in households'
preferences, and manifests itself in a self-control problem, which in turn a®ects their savings
behavior. If households are aware of their self-control problem, they may have the incentive
to look for commitment tools, which changes their preferences over di®erent types of assets.
For example, in Laibson's speci¯cation time-inconsistent households ¯nd a solution for their
self-control problem in saving for retirement in form of an illiquid asset, which is preferred over
standard life-cycle savings in liquid assets.
The second part of this thesis centers around the e®ect of children on household welfare. While
children are doubtlessly a very important factor in a household's life, household size is usually not
taken into consideration in macroeconomic research on consumption. This is perfectly logical for
most areas of macroeconomic analysis, but can have repercussions on life-cycle modelling and,
more importantly, on the e®ectiveness of welfare and inequality analysis. In the former, family
size can be approximated by rescaling consumption by equivalence scales, where the evolution of




family size is deterministic, so that children do not contribute to inequality between households,
but only induce a scale e®ect on consumption. In inequality and welfare analysis, household
data on consumption are made comparable across di®erent household sizes by using equivalence
scales in order to establish the welfare of a `representative' household member. However, this
means that additional important information useful for inter-household comparison of welfare is
quasi `out of sight'. In the context of observed growing income inequality demographic factors
may well play a more important role than generally recognized in academic literature.
The three di®erent chapters can be summarized accordingly. Chapter 1 constructs a very
simple version of the life-cycle model, in which the behavior of households with standard and
time-inconsistent time-preferences is compared. Given that no income uncertainty is assumed,
all saving will be for retirement, and there will not be any precautionary savings motive. Saving
is possible only in form of a standard liquid asset. There are no borrowing constraints, with
the exception to the No-Ponzi condition at the very end of household life. It is found that in
this setting, assuming that long-run discount rates for both types of households are the same,
present-bias and self-control problem merely lead to a delay in retirement savings, but not to
lower savings at the point of retirement. As a second step a durable good is introduced into
the model, where it is assumed that the durable and the perishable good are complements.
Deriving the Hyperbolic Euler Equation for the durable good, I ¯nd that the perishable and
the durable good are a®ected di®erently by the self-control problem. As the Euler Equations
and the simulation results show, a durable good reduces the overall e®ect of the self-control
problem on household decision making. It not only serves as an asset, but its intertemporal
properties smooth utility over time and reduce the impact of short-run impulses. In addition,
they make consumption decisions less irreversible, so that excess spending on the durable good
can be turned into savings in the liquid asset, so that the self-control problem is less of an
discouragement for saving.
Chapter 2 takes up and extends the idea of the ¯rst chapter. Again households consume a
perishable good, accumulate the durable good and save in form of a liquid ¯nancial asset. The
goal now is to achieve some power of prediction on the impact of the self-control problem and
to learn, whether the model yields trends strong enough to imply that time-inconsistency could
be visible in household data. Consequently the model is enriched by income and life-horizon un-
certainty, a bequest motive, changes in demographics, and by adjustment costs to the durables
stock. Also now there is a borrowing constraints and durables serve as collateral and in part can
be ¯nanced. The simulation results clearly show that, since the durable good serves as an asset
and also reduces the consumption response to changes in income and family size, the self-control
problem hardly a®ects savings and consumption patterns. The only notable di®erence between
the two types is greater volatility in the durables stock and in savings of time-inconsistent house-
holds. Conditional on the assumption that long-run patience is greater for hyperbolic households,
the simulation results suggest that households with time-inconsistent preferences are not easily
identi¯able from households with standard preferences. While undoubtedly in this life-cycle
framework, time-inconsistent preferences help address plausible aspects of life-cycle behavior,




they also highlight more closely the role durable goods play in shaping household consumption
patterns. Even more importantly, it is found that the predictions of a realistic life-cycle model
are robust to reasonable departures from exponential discounting.
Chapter 3 is an empirical paper with focus on the e®ect of children on household expenditure
from a macroeconomic perspective. While household expenditure is widely used as the chief in-
dicator for economic welfare, there remains a lack of transparency on how expenditure translates
into actual consumption, and how consumption is allocated within households. Nevertheless,
if expenditure does not react to an increase in household size, then household welfare of all
household members can be expected to decline. In order to learn more about the comparability
of the sensitivity of expenditure to family size, regressions are run for di®erent income groups
on the basis of CEx Data. The estimates on the e®ect of children show that the e®ect of chil-
dren on household expenditure signi¯cantly di®ers for households with di®erent income pro¯les.
A propensity score matching exercise strongly supports the result that for households with a
college degree, and, also to some extent for High School graduates, children substantially a®ect
the level of total household expenditure, as was to be expected from economic theory. However,
for households without High School degree, children do not seem to a®ect total expenditure.
This implies strong liquidity constraints for low income households, and, more generally, the
absence of savings, which not only results in great vulnerability of low income households to
adverse income shocks, but also raises signi¯cant welfare concerns. Regarding welfare analysis,
this result indicates that in studies on welfare inequality the use of equivalence scales contributes
to additional measured inequality.
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Self-Control and Durable Goods { A
Simple Study on Life-Cycle-Savings
Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate whether the impact of time-inconsistency of
preferences on life-cycle savings changes when durable goods are included in the life-
cycle model. Deriving the Hyperbolic Euler Equation for the durable good, I ¯nd
that the perishable and the durable good are a®ected di®erently by the self-control
problem. Furthermore, given its properties as an asset, including a durable good
into the model quasi eliminates the impact of the self-control problem on life-cycle
savings. This result builds on the assumption that the two goods are inseparable
in the utility function. Since the focus is on the life-cycle aspect of saving, there is
no uncertainty in the model.
JEL classi¯cation: D11, D91, E21
Keywords: Life-cycle savings, durables, time-inconsistent preferences, hyperbolic discounting
I would like to thank Salvador Ortigueira and Morten Ravn for their help and supervision. I am also very
grateful to Burcu Duygan, Winfried Koeniger and Nur Ata for very helpful discussions and comments,
and to David Laibson, Andrea Repetto and Jeremy Tobacman for invaluable help with the solution
algorithm. All errors, of course, are mine.
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1.1 Introduction
In the life-cycle literature it is a common short cut to model utility in terms of consumption of a perishable
`consumption' good. Although allowing for greater tractability, this assumption neglects that households
also derive utility from the services provided by accumulated durable goods. In this paper I show that in
a very simple, deterministic life-cycle framework, modelling durables accumulation as well as perishables
consumption not only changes the general dynamics of household behavior, as demonstrated in Fern¶ andez-
Villaverde and KrÄ uger (2005), but also changes the impact of time-inconsistency of preferences and the
resulting self-control problem. Given the asset properties of the durable good, the Hyperbolic Euler
Equations suggest that on overall the durable stock is a®ected less by the self-control problem than the
perishable good. This result is re°ected in the simulated savings and consumption pro¯les: When only
perishable goods are taken into account, the e®ect of the self-control problem is to delay retirement
savings; this e®ect disappears once durable goods are introduced into the model.
The notion of preferences being in fact time-inconsistent comes from the domain of behavioral economics
and economic psychology. Assuming time-inconsistency not only poses an intellectual challenge to the
standard fashion of time-discounting, it also - potentially - questions standard economic predictions of
human behavior. Given the implications of this divide for the economic modelling of intertemporal
decision making, it is important to assess when and under which conditions, theoretical predictions are
determined by the stand taken on the issue of time-discounting.
In the life-cycle literature the phenomenon of time-inconsistency has been investigated in a series of
papers where households can choose between saving in form of a liquid and an illiquid asset (Laibson
et al., 1998, 2001). In this framework, it is found that time-consistent and time-inconsistent households
indeed behave di®erently, for the latter struggle with a self-control problem. Here the illiquid asset helps
the time-inconsistent household commit to a savings plan, so that even in the face of income uncertainty
and the resulting need for precautionary savings, the time-inconsistent household prefers illiquid to liquid
assets.
While in Laibson et al. (1998, 2001), the mode of time-discounting has sizable implications for predicted
life-cycle savings, this does not necessarily have to be the case in other speci¯cations of the life-cycle model.
As will be shown in this paper, the introduction of a liquid durable good quasi eliminates the predicted
impact of the self-control problem on household behavior. From deriving the Hyperbolic Euler Equation
for the durable good, it becomes clear that the self-control problem a®ects the durables decision in a more
complex way than it a®ects the consumption of the perishable good. In the case of the perishable good,
only the trade-o® between current and future consumption is in°uenced by the self-control problem. For
durable goods, in addition to this trade-o®, the value of the durable stock as an asset is determined by
the degree to which, due to short run impatience, future consumption is ¯nanced by sales of the durable
good. These two forces counteract each other, so that the overall e®ect of the self-control problem on the
durable decision is reduced. This ¯nding is supported by a simulation exercise, where when durables are
taken into account, the e®ect of the time-inconsistency nearly disappears. However, unlike in Laibson et
al. (1998, 2001), this ¯nding is not due to the introduction of a commitment device since the durable
good considered here is perfectly liquid.
Section 2 o®ers a brief overview of the concept of time-inconsistent preferences and hyperbolic discounting.
Section 3 will present the standard life-cycle model without durables as well as the simulation results,
while in Section 4 durables are introduced into the model and the impact of the durable good on the
self-control problem is analyzed. Section 5 concludes.
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1.2 The concept of time-inconsistent preferences
In behavioral studies individuals often are observed to make plans for the future, but to change their mind
when it comes to realizing them, even though external circumstances have remained unchanged. This
is mainly due to a con°ict between long term goals and the need for immediate grati¯cation. Examples
where this con°ict becomes evident are the dismissal of plans on self-improvement or investments, that
have an immediate cost but yield returns or bene¯ts only with some delay. Often this pattern of behavior
is known to individuals themselves, who then attempt to commit their future selves to following a savings
or investment plan. On a day-to-day basis the search for commitment devices is re°ected in the demand for
long-term memberships in health clubs (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004), and even in the subscription
prices for magazines with investment characteristics but low entertainment value (Oster and Scott, 2005).
These observations are explained by time-inconsistency of preferences, as described in Rabin (1998),
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004).
Indeed it seems that time-discounting, far from being constant over periods, varies strongly with respect
to the time-span between the `now' and the period under consideration. A far greater degree of impatience
is observed between today and tomorrow than between `next month' and `next month and a day'. This
is true for consumption behavior as well as for the allocation of work and leisure, and decisions regarding
when to face cumbersome tasks. Hence, over time there is a change in relative preferences concerning the
timing of events and determining intertemporal choice, so that, for example, unpleasant activities are often
and repeatedly deferred. As O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) express it, preferences are \present biased
[in the sense that] when considering trade-o®s between two future moments, present biased preferences
give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer". Furthermore there is a contrast
between \long run patience and short run impatience" (Harris and Laibson, 2001).
Experimental data have allowed to measure the discount function, and there is a consensus in the literature
that the true discount factor can be approximated by a hyperbolic function of the form (1 + ®¿)
°
®, with
®;° > 0 and ¿ as the distance to the period to be discounted (Laibson et al., 2001). The way in
which time-inconsistent preferences are expressed in economics goes back to Strotz (1958), Pollak (1968),
Phelps and Pollak (1968), who use an approximation to the above function, the quasi-hyperbolic discount
factor, taking the form f1;¯±;¯±2;¯±3;:::g. Figure 1.1 in the Appendix plots the two hyperbolic discount
functions against the traditional exponential discount function. In these early studies quasi-hyperbolic
discounting is introduced mainly in order to abstract from the rather strong assumption of perfect altruism
across generations. However, in most later studies, including this one, it is used in order to capture time-
inconsistency in the intrapersonal decision making process.
In short, the general idea behind time-inconsistent discounting is that the discount rate is determined
not only by the time-span between the reference point and the event in question, but also by the distance
between the the reference point and the present. This leads to relative short run impatience contrasting
with long run patience, so that individuals exhibit greater patience when allocating consumption (or
leisure) between two future dates, than when deciding whether to save (or work) today or tomorrow. In
other words, from the point of view of today, the future is discounted extra just because it is the future,
while `within the future' this distinction does not matter. As the date for which a decision is to be made
draws closer, the discount factor changes and additional weight is given to the present which can change
the way the allocation problem is solved.
From this it follows that plans made at present for the future will most likely not be followed up in the
future, and individuals have a self-control problem. The e®ect of the self-control problem depends on
whether it is anticipated by the individual. Here assuming rationality is equivalent to the assumption
AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
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that the time-inconsistency of her preferences is known to the individual, who takes it into account when
making the allocation decision. Given rationality, the solution to the intratemporal allocation problem
lies in an intrapersonal game played by the current self against all future selves. This also is the reason
why in Laibson et al. (1998, 2001) illiquidity of an asset stimulates savings: By investing in an illiquid
asset the current self de facto commits the future selves to a savings plan. In the literature rational
individuals are commonly referred to as `sophisticated'1.
1.3 A simple life-cycle model with time-inconsistent preferences
1.3.1 Model set-up
The model used in this section is a very simple version of the standard life-cycle model, except for the
introduction of nonstandard, time-inconsistent preferences of the type described above. Time is ¯nite
and discrete so that t 2 ft1;:::;T + N ¡ 1;T + Ng, where T is the time spent working and N is the time
spent in retirement. Labor supply is inelastic and income is exogenous. Since there is neither income
nor life-horizon uncertainty, the setting is purely deterministic. Households can borrow against future
income and there is no borrowing limit, except for the households not to die in debt at the end of period
T+N. Since in this model households cannot leave any bequests and due to the absence of uncertainty,
all saving will be motivated by life-cycle concerns.
Each period households are able to invest in an interest bearing ¯nancial asset a by saving. Apart from












where ¯ represents the additional discounting of the future due to short run impatience; ± is the standard
discount factor and hence denotes long run impatience. Consequently at time t, the household chooses










subject to the budget constraint
ct + at+1 = Rat + yt = xt (1.4)
1While rationality is a common assumption in most studies investigating long-term planning, many studies
focussing on the behavioral aspects of time-inconsistency allow for individuals to be irrational. Here irrationality
is identi¯ed with `naivety', derived from the inability to recognize that short run impatience is an inherent part
of time-discounting and will in°uence future decisions as well as current ones. Hence in each period the naive
individual will ¯rmly believe that from tomorrow onwards she will act as today she thinks she should. Each
recurrent lapse into impatience is considered the last one.
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In the budget constraint xt summarizes cash-on-hand held by the household at time t; the price of the
consumption good has been normalized to one. Households receive income Yt for t 2 ft0 · t · Tg, where
income is an increasing concave function of age; while for t 2 fT + 1 · t · T + Ng, Yt = · £ YT. Initial
asset holdings are zero.
1.3.2 Equilibrium conditions
Following Harris and Laibson (2001), the value functions are derived and the resulting policy functions
will be the equilibrium strategy of an intrapersonal Markov game, as explained in Section 2.
Due to hyperbolic discounting self t conceptually distinguishes between the current value of cash-on-hand
in period t, Wt;t(xt) and the continuation value Vt;t+1(xt+1) in period t of cash on hand in period t + 1.
Wt;t(xt) = max
ct
fu(ct) + ¯±Vt;t+1(xt+1)g (1.5)
Vt;t+1(xt+1) = max
ct+1
fu(ct+1) + ±Vt+1;t+2(xt+2)g (1.6)





Hyperbolic discounting implies that self t attaches a di®erent value to next period cash-on-hand than
self t + 1 does. In the absence of a perfect commitment technology this inconsistency will give rise to
a self-control problem, since self t cannot control self t + 10s savings decisions. Since households are
assumed to be rational, or `sophisticated', they foresee by how far future selves will diverge from any
current savings plan. Hence self t makes her own decisions based on her expectation on the in°uence
of the future selves' impatience on future savings. The equilibrium strategies played in this game are a
sequence of policy functions fc¤
tg
T+N
1 that solve for Wt;t(xt) and Vt;t+1(xt+1), subject to the conditions
imposed by sophistication.
By construction, the sophisticated self t is thus fully aware of the time-inconsistency of her preferences
but cannot control the consumption and savings decisions of self t+1. Nevertheless self t can foresee the
level of consumption chosen by self t + 1 given the state variable xt+1 in period t + 1.































Clearly, unless ¯ = 1, in which case preferences are time-consistent and one returns to the standard case,
Wt+1;t+1(xt+1) 6= Vt;t+1(xt+1)
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In short at any time t, a sophisticated household foresees that the present bias will repeat itself in the
next period. This will be taken into account when making the savings and consumption decisions at time
t.





















The proof for Proposition 1 can be found in Section B in the Appendix.
Equation (1.7) is the Hyperbolic Euler Equation derived by Harris and Laibson (2001), and applied to
the risk-free case. The HEE is very similar to the standard Euler Equation, the only di®erence being
that the term in squared brackets has replaced the usual exponential discount factor. Here, the e®ective
discount factor consists of the discount factor at period t, ¯±, weighted by the marginal propensity in
period t + 1 to consume out of period t savings, plus the long run discount factor ±, weighted by the
marginal propensity to save in period t + 1. The more of period t savings will be consumed by the next
self, the smaller is the e®ective discount factor, and hence the greater is period t consumption. The more
heavily self t expects self t + 1 to consume out of her own savings, the less she is willing to save. As
long as self t can only foresee but not control self t + 1's consumption decisions, she will react to future
impatience by giving greater weight to her own need for immediate grati¯cation. Hence for the same ±,





Obviously, setting ¯ = 1 one returns to the standard Euler Equation with standard exponential discount-
ing, where preferences are time-consistent and the self-control problem does not arise.
1.3.3 Calibration
The values used for the discount factors and risk aversion come from the calibration results in Laibson
et al. (2001). For simpli¯cation households lend and borrow at the same interest rate; the value for
the fraction of income received at retirement, ·, is hypothetical, although intuitively sensible. The other
values lie within the range commonly assumed in the literature.
Table 1.1: Calibrated parameters
¯ ± ¾ R ·
0.7 0.95 2 1.04 0.4
Further it should be noted, that in order to isolate the e®ect of the time-inconsistency, in the following
the outcome for households with time-inconsistent preferences will be compared with the counterfactual
outcome for households with time-consistent preferences. Although in the literature it is the norm to
assume that for time-inconsistent individuals, long run patience is greater than in the standard time-
consistent case, in order to allow for better comparison between the two cases, I assume the same long
run discount factor for both types of households.
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1.3.4 Results
Figure 1.2 in the Appendix compares savings of households with time-inconsistent preferences (hyperbol-
ics) and with time-consistent preferences (exponentials). Both households spend most of their working
life in debt, and only accumulate retirement savings during the last decade before retirement.
Although it is a common ¯nding that young households borrow against future income, here the size of
their debt is unusually large. This has two reasons. Firstly no borrowing constraint, with the exception
of the No Ponzi condition, has been imposed. Secondly, due to the absence of uncertainty in this model,
there is no motivation for precautionary savings.
From Figure 1.2 two things are evident. The e®ect of the time-inconsistency on savings at retirement
is very small. However, the self-control problem has a clear impact on the timing of retirement savings.
While for very young households, time-inconsistency increases debt only marginally, it does delay debt
repayment and saving for retirement. Returning to the Hyperbolic Euler Equation (1.7), this is not
surprising and con¯rms that the savings decision today is determined by the decision on whether to save
in the future. Given current impatience, the self-control problem prevents early debt repayment as long
as future selves are predicted to diverge from the savings plan. Or, in other words, future impatience
drives current debt.
During retirement, both types of households behave very similarly. Surprisingly, hyperbolic households
slightly delay dissaving in order to forestall against the consequences of impatience in the very last years
of household life. Although this result is counter-intuitive at ¯rst, it is explained by the Inada conditions
and the very high marginal utility at low levels of consumption. For newly retired households, the fear
of very low consumption levels at the very end of life overweighs their own short run impatience, so that
the propensity to consume becomes negative. This leads to the surprising result that during most of
retirement the time-inconsistent household acts more patiently than the time-consistent household.
To summarize, the self-control problem mainly a®ects the timing, but not the amount of saving for
retirement. This is equivalent to less consumption smoothing for time-inconsistent households.
1.4 A life-cycle model with time-inconsistent preferences and
durable goods
1.4.1 Model set-up
Now a durable good is added to the model presented in the previous section. Since now households derive






where g (ct;Dt) is assumed to be of the CES type, so that
g (ct;Dt) = [®c¿




The elasticity of substitution ¿ between durable and perishable goods determines whether the two goods
are inseparable in the utility function. When ¿ < 1, the marginal utility of perishables consumption
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depends on the durables stock and vice versa.
Durable goods depreciate at rate ° and in each period households can sell what is left of the previous
period's durables stock and use the returns to purchase new durable and perishable goods. Further, in
order to make durables completely liquid, there are no adjustment costs to changes in the durables stock.





Again ¯ signi¯es the additional discounting of the future due to short run impatience. Consequently, a









subject to the budget constraint
ct + Dt + at+1 = xt + (1 ¡ °)Dt¡1 (1.11)
where
xt = Rat + yt
such that
xt+1 = R(xt + ct ¡ Dt + (1 ¡ °)Dt¡1) + yt+1 (1.12)
In the budget constraint (1.11), xt summarizes cash-on-hand held by the household at time t; the price
of durables and perishables has been normalized to one. This also implies that households buy and sell
durables at the same price.
1.4.2 Equilibrium conditions
Again following Harris and Laibson (2001) as a guideline, the two value functions for the hyperbolic
household are derived. The resulting policy functions will be the equilibrium strategies of an intertem-
poral Markov game. Due to hyperbolic discounting, self t conceptually distinguishes between the current
value in period t, Wt;t(xt;Dt¡1) of cash-on-hand and the preexisting durables stock, and the continuation
value, Vt;t+1(xt+1;Dt) of cash-on-hand and durables carried over into period t+1. Hence the equilibrium
is de¯ned by two value functions
Wt;t(xt;Dt¡1) = max
ct;Dt
fu(ct;Dt) + ¯±Vt;t+1(xt+1;Dt)g (1.13)
Vt;t+1(xt+1;Dt) = max
ct+1;Dt+1
fu(ct+1;Dt+1) + ±Vt+1;t+2(xt+2;Dt+1)g (1.14)
subject to the budget constraint (1.11).
In the absence of bequests it holds that for t = T + N
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1 solving for Wt;t(xt;Dt¡1)
and Vt;t+1(xt+1;Dt), plus the conditions imposed by sophisticated households. Again sophistication im-





ct+1 + at+2 + Dt+1 = xt+1 + (1 ¡ °)Dt
where xt+1 is given by (1.12). Self t is thus fully aware of the time-inconsistency of preferences, but
cannot control the consumption and savings decision of self t + 1. Nevertheless self t can foresee the
perishables consumption and durables stock chosen by self t + 1, given the states in period t + 1, xt=1































Clearly, unless ¯ = 1, in which case one returns to the standard case with time-consistent preferences,
Wt+1;t+1(xt+1;Dt) 6= Vt;t+1(xt+1;Dt)
Proposition 2 In the presence of a durable good the Hyperbolic Euler Equation for the perishable good




t(xt;Dt¡1) are the policy functions for the
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The Proof for Proposition 2 is found in the Appendix, Section C.
The ¯rst term on the RHS of the Hyperbolic Euler Equation for the perishable good (1.15) is consistent
with the standard Euler Equation in the time-consistent case. The term in squared brackets shows, that,
when preferences are time-inconsistent, the marginal propensity to spend current savings on perishables
and durables in the next period, decreases the marginal cost of current consumption. Consequently the
sophisticated, present-biased hyperbolic household will consume more of the perishable good in period t
when the future marginal propensity to consume out of her savings is positive. This is a direct consequence
of the self-control problem, given that households are sophisticated and anticipate the in°uence of the
present-bias on future consumption and savings decisions, but cannot control their future behavior.












































The proof for Proposition 3 can be found in Section C in the Appendix.
The ¯rst term on the RHS of the Hyperbolic Euler Equation for the durable good (1.16) is identical to
the RHS of the standard Euler Equation for durables when preferences are time-consistent. Note, that
the durable good functions as an asset, where (R ¡ 1 + °) is the return foregone by not having invested
in the ¯nancial asset.
From the terms in squared brackets it is apparent that the self-control problem a®ects the durables
decision in two o®setting ways. Firstly, as in the previous case, the marginal propensity to consume out
of savings in period t + 1, reduces the marginal cost of durables purchases in terms of foregone savings,
and hence increases spending on durables in period t. Secondly the durable good not only yields utility
directly, but also serves as an asset. Consequently, the greater is the marginal propensity to consume out
of the sales of durables in period t+1, the lower is the value of holding the durable good as an asset. This
is ampli¯ed by the durable good being return dominated by the ¯nancial asset, and reduces investment
in the durables stock in period t. The two e®ects of the self-control problem on the durables decision are
of opposite sign and hence o®set each other.
The overall impact of the time-inconsistency on household behavior is determined by the relationship
between durables and perishables in the utility function. When the two goods are inseparable in the
utility function, the marginal utility of the perishable good depends on the durables stock. If the overall
e®ect of the self-control problem is lower for the durable good, this can `feed through' to the consumption
decision for the perishable good. Hence, in a model with a durable good, the behavior of households
with time-inconsistent preferences should be more similar to the standard time-consistent case than when
durables are not taken into account.
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1.4.3 Calibration
The calibration values for the old parameters remain unchanged. Regarding the parameters concerning
the durable good, I follow Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and KrÄ uger (2005) in assuming zero substitutability
between perishables and durables, drawing on past estimates on the elasticity of substitution in the
utility function (Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), and Rupert et al. (1995)), so that perishables and durables
are complements and (1.9) takes the Cobb-Douglas form. The rate of durables depreciation, °, and the
weight of the perishable good in the utility function, ®, are hypothetical but within the range commonly
assumed.
Table 1.2: Calibrated parameters
¯ ± ¾ ® R ° ·
0.7 0.95 2 0.7 1.04 0.1 0.4
Again, in order to isolate the e®ect of the time-inconsistency, in the following the outcome for households
with time-inconsistent preferences will be compared to the counterfactual outcome for time-consistent
households. In order to allow for better comparison between the two types, I assume the same long-run
discount factor for both kinds of households.
1.4.4 Results for the model with durables
As Figures (1.3) and (1.4) in the Appendix show, now the savings pro¯les and the durables stock for
hyperbolic and exponential households are very similar. Compared to the simple model in section 3,
both types of households start at a higher level of debt and reach their maximum amount of debt earlier.
The reason is that at the beginning of household life, households invest heavily in the durables stock,
which then remains largely unchanged with only minor readjustments due to depreciation. While this
phenomenon is commonly observed in the literature (Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and KrÄ uger, 2005), here it
is reinforced by the deterministic income process and the resulting lack of a precautionary motive for
savings or debt-restraint. Retirement savings are now somewhat lower while households consume their
savings faster and run into debt again at the end of their lives. The end-of-life debt is paid o® by the
sale of the remaining durables in the last period before death, so that the No Ponzi condition remains
satis¯ed.
In this version of the life-cycle model the time-inconsistency no longer delays retirement savings. Now
hyperbolics and exponentials only di®er in that savings and durables stock of hyperbolic households
are rather volatile. While exponential households initially invest heavily in the durables stock and then
maintain it at its level, hyperbolic households alternate between buying and selling durables. The reason
for this volatility is that the hyperbolic household, due to her short-run impatience, consumes too much
of the perishable good, and, since the two goods are complements, overinvests in the durables stock.
Subsequently, however, the household will need to save for retirement. Since the two goods are comple-
ments, instead of solely reducing consumption of the perishable good, she will also sell a portion of her
durables stock and reconvert them into savings. Depending on age, and on the two state variables, these
two phases alternate.
Given that they are return dominated by savings, as a result of the short-run impatience durables are
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used as an asset excessively, which is anticipated by the sophisticated household. From the Hyperbolic
Euler Equations (1.16) we see that the overall impact of the self-control problem is smaller for the durable
good. At the same time, since the durable good is a tangible asset, with respect to life-cycle savings,
over-investing in durables is not the same as overconsumption of perishables, since the durable stock can
be reconverted into savings. For these reasons, in the presence of a durable good, future impatience does
not discourage savings to the degree observed in the case when there are only perishables. As a result,
the life-cycle pro¯les of hyperbolic and exponential households are very similar.
1.5 Conclusion
From the Hyperbolic Euler Equations as well as from the simulation results it has become clear that, at
least in a deterministic setting, the introduction of a durable good essentially eliminates the impact of
the self-control problem on life-cycle savings of hyperbolic households.
This is due to the liquid durable good allowing the hyperbolic household to recover excessive spending
since durables can be reconverted into savings. Nevertheless, this strategy is ine±cient, and, since the
sophisticated household anticipates future sales of the durable good, the overall e®ect of the self-control
problem is reduced. Here, the durable good is perfectly liquid, so that it does not function as a commit-
ment device between current and future selves and the self-control problem is not solved.
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Figure 1.1: Comparison of Discount factors
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comparison of hyperbolics’ and exponentials’ savings







Figure 1.2: Comparison of hyperbolic and exponential life-cycle savings in the simple model










































Figure 1.3: Comparison of hyperbolic and exponential life-cycle pro¯les in the the model with
durables
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of hyperbolic and exponential life-cycle savings and durables stock
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1.B The model without a durable good
De¯nition of the equilibrium
The equilibrium is de¯ned by two value functions
Wt;t (xt) = max
ct
fu(ct) + ¯±Vt;t+1 (xt+1)g (1.17)
Vt;t+1 (xt+1) = max
ct+1
fu(ct+1) + ±Vt+1;t+2 (xt+2)g (1.18)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + at+1 = xt
where
xt = R ¢ at + yt
and a sequence of policy functions fc¤
tg
T+N
0 that solve for Wt;t (xt) and Vt;t+1 (xt+1), plus the conditions
imposed by sophisticated households. Sophistication implies that at time t self t knows that in period
t+1, self t+1 will maximize
Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1) = max
ct+1
fu(ct+1) + ¯±Vt+1;t+2 (xt+2)g
subject to
ct+1 + at+2 = xt+1
Self t is thus fully aware of the time-inconsistency of preferences but cannot control the consumption and
savings decisions of self t+1. Nevertheless self t can foresee the level of consumption chosen by self t+1
given the state variable in period t+1, xt+1. Hence self t anticipates that












































Clearly, unless ¯ = 1, in which case preferences are time consistent and one returns to the standard case,
Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1) 6= Vt;t+1 (xt+1)
In short at any time t a sophisticated household foresees that the present bias will repeat itself in the
next period. This will be taken into account when making the saving and consumption decisions at time
t.
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Proof of Proposition 1






































































In order to derive
@Wt+1;t+1(xt+1)
@xt+1 I use the envelope condition for the state variable xt+1 in period t+1.

































































Using the FOC for ct (1.20); one sees that the term in the squared bracket cancels out, so that the
















































Now the marginal propensity to spend current savings on next period consumption decreases the marginal
cost of current consumption. This is due to the household being fully aware of the time-inconsistency of
her preferences, so that, although the current self cannot control future consumption decisions, she takes
them into account when making her own savings decision. Hence the e®ective discount factor is the term
in squared brackets.
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1.C The model with a durable good
De¯nition of the equilibrium
The equilibrium is de¯ned by two value functions
Wt;t (xt;Dt¡1) = max
ct;Dt
fu(ct;Dt) + ¯±Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt)g (1.24)
Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt) = max
ct+1;Dt+1
fu(ct+1;Dt+1) + ±Vt+1;t+2 (xt+2;Dt+1)g (1.25)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + at+1 + Dt = xt + (1 ¡ °)Dt¡1
where the state variable xt is given by past savings plus period t income so that
xt = R ¢ at + yt
and hence
xt+1 = R(xt ¡ ct ¡ Dt + (1 ¡ °)Dt¡1) + yt+1 (1.26)




0 that solve for Wt;t (xt;Dt¡1) and Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt), plus
the conditions imposed by sophisticated households. Sophistication implies that at time t self t knows
that in period t+1, self t+1 will maximize
Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1;Dt) = max
ct+1;Dt+1
fu(ct+1;Dt+1) + ¯±Vt+1;t+2 (xt+2;Dt+1)g
subject to
ct+1 + at+2 + Dt+1 = xt+1 + (1 ¡ °)Dt
where xt+1 is given by (1.26). Self t is thus fully aware of the time-inconsistency of preferences but
cannot control the consumption and savings decisions of self t+1. Nevertheless self t can foresee the level
of consumption and durables purchases chosen by self t+1 given the states in period t+1, xt+1 and Dt:
Hence self t anticipates that

















































Clearly, unless ¯ = 1, in which case one returns to the standard case with time-consistent preferences,
Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1;Dt) 6= Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt)
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In short at any time t a sophisticated household foresees that the present bias will repeat itself in the
next period. This will be taken into account when making the saving and consumption decisions at time
t.
First Order Conditions
The First Order Condition for the Perishable Good












































The First Order Condition for the Durable Good















































































Proof of proposition 2
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In order to derive
@Wt+1;t+1(xt+1;Dt)
@xt+1 ; I use the envelope condition for the state variable xt+1 in period t+1.














































































@Dt+1 = ¡R; and @Dt





















































Using the FOCs for ct (1.28) and Dt (1.29); one sees that the terms in the squared brackets cancel out,






























































Now the marginal propensity to spend current savings on next period perishable goods and durables
purchases decreases the marginal cost of current consumption. This is due to the household being fully
aware of the time-inconsistency of her preferences, so that, although the current self cannot control future
consumption decisions, she takes them into account when making her own savings decision.
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Proof of proposition 3







































In order to obtain
@Wt+1;t+1(xt+1;Dt)
@Dt we use the envelope condition for the state variable Dt at time t+1.







































































































































Due to the two FOCs (1.28) and (1.29), the terms in the ¯rst two squared brackets cancel and the envelope
condition for Dt reduces to
@Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1;Dt)
@Dt








Hence, again using the FOC for the perishable good (1.28) yields
@Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1;Dt)
@Dt









Returning to the reformed ¯rst order condition for the durable good (1.32) we note that the ¯rst term
in squared brackets is the RHS of the HEE for the perishable good at time t, as derived above in (1.31).
Further substituting the envelope condition for the Durable stock one can rewrite the ¯rst order condition
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Equation (1.33) clearly shows that the marginal bene¯t from investing in the durable stock at time t has
to equal the marginal cost. From the ¯rst term on the RHS it is clear that the Durable good has the
character of an asset, so that the marginal cost of purchasing the durable good in terms of consumption
in the next period is determined by the di®erence between the interest rate and the survival rate of
the durable good. This part of the HEE for the durable good is identical to the EE for durables in
the standard setting with time-consistent preferences. The second term shows how the durable decision
at time t is a®ected by the time-inconsistency of preferences. On the one hand, as in the case of the
perishable good, the propensity to consume in period t+1 out of period t savings reduces the marginal
cost of the durable good in period t and hence increases the amount of durables purchased. On the
other hand, self t also knows by how much self t+1 will increase her spending out of the proceeds from
the durables sales in period t+1. Hence the propensity to consume out of future durables sales reduces
the amount of the durable good purchased today, since it reduces the value of the durable good as an
asset. Note further that assuming ¯ = 1 reduces the problem to the standard case with time-consistent
preferences and the exponential discount factor ±: As can be shown easily, setting ¯ = 1 in the FOCs
reduces them to the standard Euler Equation for the perishable good and to the equivalent to (1.33) for
the time-consistent case.
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Eat Your Pie And Have It - Does
Time-Inconsistency Show In A
Life-cycle Model With Durable
Goods?
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of time-inconsistent preferences in a life-cycle model
with a durable good. Since the durable good serves as an asset, and also reduces the
consumption response to changes in income and family size, the self-control problem af-
fects retirement savings less than in a model where only perishable goods are taken into
account. Conditional on the standard assumption that long-run patience is greater for hy-
perbolic households, the simulation results suggest that households with time-inconsistent
preferences are not easily identi¯able from households with standard preferences. The pre-
dictions of a realistic life-cycle model are robust to reasonable departures from exponential
discounting.
JEL classi¯cation: D11, D91, E21
Keywords: Life-cycle savings, durables, time-inconsistent preferences, hyperbolic discounting
I would like to thank Salvador Ortigueira and Morten Ravn for their help and supervision. I am also
very grateful to Nur Ata, Giancarlo Corsetti, Burcu Duygan, Winfried Koeniger and Karel Mertens for
very helpful discussions and comments, and to David Laibson, Andrea Repetto and Jeremy Tobacman
for invaluable help with the solution algorithm. All errors, of course, are mine.
35
AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/228836 CHAPTER 2. EAT YOUR PIE AND HAVE IT
2.1 Introduction
Introducing time-inconsistent preferences into a model with durable goods, this paper incorporates two
new approaches in the life-cycle literature. The objective is to learn how the impact of time-inconsistency,
and the resulting self-control problem, is a®ected by the presence of a durable good, which provides utility
but also preserves its value, and hence serves as an asset. Indeed, the simulated savings and consumption
pro¯les for households with time-inconsistent preferences are nearly indistinguishable from the pro¯les
of households with standard preferences. Conditional on the di®erent discount rates calibrated for the
two household types and given the dual role played by the durable good, the predictions of a realistic
life-cycle model are robust to reasonable departures from exponential discounting.
The motivation behind this study is threefold. Firstly, the essence of modern life-cycle literature is the
idea that households smooth utility, and hence consumption, over the di®erent stages of life, as has been
formulated ¯rst by Friedman in 1957. However, as long as only perishable goods are taken into account,
the empirically observed hump shape of consumer expenditure over the life-cycle suggests, that this
hypothesis is problematic. As Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) show, this changes once durable
goods are introduced. Secondly, in the life-cycle context the e®ect of the self-control problem has only
been investigated when the household had to choose between saving in ¯nancial assets and consuming
a perishable good. Assuming that at least one of the goods from which the household derives utility is
durable, reduces the trade-o® between current and future grati¯cation. Since the self-control problem is
a problem of imperfect intratemporal resource allocation, it is intuitive to expect, that a durable good
will narrow the gap between current and future interests, and should hence reduce the e®ect of time-
inconsistency on savings and consumption decisions. Thirdly, the concept of time-inconsistency itself is
a challenge to the standard approach taken towards modelling intertemporal choice. Given this potential
divide it is important to assess, in how far a stand taken on this issue actually determines economic
predictions on human behavior. While the life-cycle model is only one of many potential applications to
this question, its very subject makes it one of the most interesting ones.
In the light of the general performance of the life-cycle model, the introduction of a durable good in
addition to the standard \perishable" or \consumption" good is very promising. Durable goods not
only a®ect the intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving, but have meaningful implications
for the Euler Equation of the consumption good, when the two goods are not perfect substitutes in the
utility function. As observed in Padula (1999) complementarity between the two goods also markedly
improves the empirical support for the Euler Equation. Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) ¯nd that
durable goods, especially when they serve as collateral for loans, help replicate the hump in expenditure
observed over the life-cycle. Here the accumulation of durable goods by young households also serves as
a precautionary savings device in the face of income uncertainty. Pavan (2005) furthermore investigates
the interplay of durables accumulation and bankruptcy legislation in the life-cycle framework, and again
¯nds that durables acquisitions are subject to precautionary savings motives.
The introduction of time-inconsistent preferences into the life-cycle model goes back to Laibson (1997)
and Laibson et al. (1998, 2001), where the implications of time-inconsistent preferences, or hyperbolic
discounting, on savings behavior are investigated. The concept of time-inconsistent preferences has
been extensively addressed in the previous chapter. Again, however, it is necessary to stress that the
contrast between short run impatience and long run patience can a®ect individuals' preferences for savings
instruments. In Laibson (1997) and Laibson et al. (1998, 2001) the key ¯nding is that an illiquid
¯nancial asset acts as a commitment device, and hence helps a household overcome her self-control
problem and consequently stimulates savings. In the previous chapter it is found that, to a large extent,
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the intertemporal properties of the durable good can eliminate the e®ect of the self-control problem
on retirement savings. This chapter builds on this result, but does not conjecture that, when durable
goods are taken into account, an illiquid asset is no longer needed. Nevertheless, since investment in the
durables stock reduces the need for savings in form of a ¯nancial asset, ¯nding a commitment device is
less important.
Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 explains the calibration of the model parameters. In Section
4 the simulation results are presented and explained, Section 5 concludes.
2.2 A life-cycle model with durable goods
2.2.1 Model set-up
The version of the life-cycle model used here is a partial equilibrium model with inelastic labor supply and
exogenous interest rate and income process. The key features of the model are the inclusion of a durable
good and labor income uncertainty. Further taken into account are subjective life-horizon uncertainty,
bequests and changes in family size, where the fertility decision is not modelled, so that family composition
evolves exogenously. Although from the perspective of the household, the time of death is uncertain, all
households live for T+N periods. They work for T periods and spend their remaining life in retirement.
Since labor income is uncertain for the ¯rst T periods, each period t households receive income according
to
yW
t = f (aget) + ut
where f (aget) is a cubic function of age and ut expresses labor income uncertainty. During retirement
households are certain to receive income
yR
t = g (aget)
Each period t, households decide how much to save, how much of a perishable good to consume and how


















where ct is consumption of the perishable good, Dt is the household's durables stock, and nt is e®ective
family size. Since within the household neither good is a public good, and since the wellbeing of all
household members is taken into account, e®ective family size is included in the utility function in order
to capture that bigger households need greater amounts of both goods.












+ (1 ¡ st+i)B (at+i;Dt+i¡1;nt+i¡1)]
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Here the product term in round brackets expresses the probability of the household surviving until the
end of period t+i¡1. With probability st+i the households survives into period t+i, while (1 ¡ st+i) is
the probability of dying between period t+i¡1 and period t+i, for which case B(at+i;Dt+i¡1;nt+i¡1)
de¯nes the bequest value of the household's assets and durables stock at the time of death. Note that
sT+N+1 is zero, since the maximum age a household can reach is T + N. The hyperbolic household's
short run impatience is captured by ¯, while ± is equivalent to the standard exponential discount factor.
Each period the household maximizes
U (ct;Dt;nt) = u(ct;Dt;nt) + CPt (2.2)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + dt + h(dt) + at+1 = Rat + yt (2.3)
where cash-on-hand in period t, Rat +yt = xt, is determined by savings with interest in period t¡1 and
the realization of income in period t. Hence cash-on-hand in period t + 1 evolves according to
xt+1 = R(xt ¡ ct ¡ dt ¡ h(dt)) + yt+1 (2.4)
The amount of durables held in period t is determined by the investment in the durables stock dt and
the amount of durables carried over from period t ¡ 1, where ° is the rate at which the durables stock
depreciates between periods. Hence
Dt = dt + (1 ¡ °)Dt¡1 (2.5)
The price of durables and perishables has been normalized to one and households can sell o® their durables
stock at the same price at which they purchase new durables. Nevertheless the durable good is illiquid
in the sense that whenever durables are traded, a transition cost h(dt) proportional to the size of the
transaction has to be paid.
Furthermore, borrowing is restricted to fraction (1 ¡ µ) of current durables holding Dt, so that durables
also serve as collateral for loans. Hence for all periods up to t = T + N ¡ 1 it holds that
at+1 ¸ ¡(1 ¡ µ)Dt (2.6)
All debt has to be repaid in period T+N at latest. The interest rate is constant and the same for bor-
rowing and lending.
2.2.2 Equilibrium Conditions
In order to characterize the equilibrium, I follow the approach taken by Harris and Laibson (2001) and
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derive the two value functions for the hyperbolic household. The resulting policy functions will be the
equilibrium strategies of an intertemporal Markov game. Due to hyperbolic discounting, self t concep-
tually distinguishes between the current value in period t, Wt;t (xt;Dt¡1;n;s) of cash-on-hand and the
existing durables stock, and the continuation value, Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s) of cash-on-hand and durables
carried over into period t + 1, both determined by the evolution of family size n, the vector of survival
probabilities s, and the expectation on future income. Hence the equilibrium is de¯ned by the two value
functions
Wt;t (xt;Dt¡1;n;s) = max
ct;dt
fu(ct;Dt;nt) + ¯± (st+1EtVt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s)
+ (1 ¡ st+1)B (at+1;Dt;nt))g (2.7)
Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s) = max
ct+1;dt+1
fu(ct+1;Dt+1;nt+1) + ± (st+2Et+1Vt+1;t+2 (xt+2;Dt+1;n;s)
+ (1 ¡ st+2)B (at+2;Dt+1;nt+1))g (2.8)
subject to the budget constraint (2.3) and the borrowing constraint (2.6). Due to the bequest motive it
holds that for t = T + N
VT+N;T+N+1 (xT+N+1;DT+N;n;s) = B (aT+N+1;DT+N;nT+N)
and hence








1 solves for Wt;t (xt;Dt¡1;n;s) and Vt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s), given
the conditions imposed by sophisticated households. Sophistication implies that at time t, self t knows,
that, given the realization of income in period t + 1, self t + 1 will maximize
Wt+1;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s) = max
ct+1;dt+1
fu(ct+1;Dt+1;nt+1) + ¯± (st+2Et+1Vt+1;t+2 (xt+2;Dt+1;n;s)
+ (1 ¡ st+2)B (at+2;Dt+1;nt+1))g
subject to the budget constraint for period t + 1, where xt+1 is given by (2.4).
Self t is thus fully aware of the time-inconsistency of preferences but cannot control the consumption
and savings decisions of self t + 1. Nevertheless, self t can foresee the level of consumption and durables
purchases chosen by self t + 1, given the states in period t + 1, xt+1 and Dt, as well as the evolution of
family size n and survival probabilities s. Hence self t anticipates that
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From (2.9) it is apparent that self t, when making her own savings and consumption decisions, will take
into account how self t + 1 will react to a change in period t savings and durables stock. Clearly, unless
¯ = 1, in which case one returns to the standard case with time-consistent preferences,
EtWt+1;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s) 6= EtVt;t+1 (xt+1;Dt;n;s)
After the model parameters have been calibrated, the model is solved using numerical solution methods
and a backwards induction algorithm as described in Appendix B. In the following, in order to evaluate
the e®ect of the time-inconsistency on household decisions, the pro¯les of time-inconsistent (hyperbolic)
households will be compared to the counterfactual outcome for time-consistent (exponential) households.
2.3 Calibration
The income process, evolution of family size, interest rate and the time-discount factors are taken from
Laibson et al. (2001). The parameters regarding the durable good are those calibrated by Fern¶ andez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2005).
2.3.1 Income process
Laibson et al. (2001) estimate the income process using PSID data (1983-1990) and distinguish between
di®erent levels of education (no High school certi¯cate, High School certi¯cate and college diploma). In
order to account for variations in income unrelated to household age and education, they include cohort
and cyclical dummies in the regression. The authors also distinguish between a pre-retirement and a
post-retirement income process. Hence in the model, for each level of education h, pre-retirement house-




hold income evolves according to
y
W;h
t = fh (aget) + uh
t
where fh (aget) is a cubic function of age and uh
t is labor income uncertainty in form of a 2-stage Markov
process with support [¡µh;µh] and constant transition probabilities [ph;1 ¡ ph].
Retired households receive income
y
R;h
t = gh (aget)
where gh (aget) is a linear, decreasing function of age. During retirement there is no income uncertainty.
Table 3.2 and Table 2.2 in Appendix A show the parameter values of the respective income processes as
estimated by Laibson et al. (2001), Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the deterministic part of household
income over the life-cycle for the three types of households.
2.3.2 Demographics
Household life begins at age 20, and retirement, as in Laibson et al. (2001) depends on the household
type. Households with incomplete High School education retire at age 61, households with a High School
certi¯cate at age 63, and households with a college degree at age 65. The population weights for the
three groups are 0.25, 0.50 and 0.25 respectively.
Table 2.3 reports the estimation results for household decomposition from Laibson et al. (2001), also
to be seen in Figure 2.2. In order to capture the e®ect of family size and decomposition on household
utility, I construct e®ective family size using the o±cial OECD scale, which gives weight 1 to the ¯rst
adult, weight 0.67 to the following adults and weight 0.43 to each child. In the following a household is
assumed to consist at least of household head and spouse.
Household mortality is such, that from the perspective of the household the time of death is uncertain,
but the maximum age households can reach is 99 years. The subjective survival probabilities are taken
from the U.S. Decennial Life-Tables for 1979-81 and reported in Figure 2.3 in Appendix A.
Bequests are set to be the sum of ¯nancial assets and remaining durables, where depreciation °, and sell-
ing costs h(Dt) of the entire remaining durables stock are taken into account. Hence the utility derived
from leaving a bequest is given by the following












2.3.3 The durable good
The price of the durable good and the price of the perishable good are normalized to one. With respect
to the depreciation rate of the durable good, I follow Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005), who
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calibrate ° = :081 on the basis of the ratio of expenditure on perishables and durables using NIPA data.
Although the household can sell her durables at any time, durables are illiquid in the sense, that, when
durables are bought or sold, an adjustment - or transactions cost has to be paid. In order to capture the
size of these costs, I draw on the results in Martin and Gruber (2005), who using CES data for housing
sales, derive a proportional purchasing cost of 2.5% and a proportional selling cost of 7% for the mean
household. Intuitively it is sensible to assume, that transaction cost are nonlinear and concave. They
increase with the amount of the durable good purchased or sold, however less so as the amount of the
durable good traded becomes large. Using the above estimates of the transaction costs for housing, and
assuming that housing is the largest durable good, I model transaction costs as concave functions of
the amount of the durable traded, converging to 2.5% and 7% respectively as the amount of durables
purchased or sold increases.
Furthermore it is assumed that durables serve as collateral for loans. Equivalently, borrowing cannot
exceed fraction (1 ¡ µ) of the durables stock; hence the borrowing constraint is endogenous. I follow
Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) as well as Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2005) who assume a ¯xed
down payment of 20% of the durables purchase, so that µ = 0:2.
2.3.4 Utility function
As in Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005), perishables and durables are modelled as complements.
This decision is motivated by the results of Rupert et al. (1995) and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), who
empirically estimate the substitutability between perishables and durables, and ¯nd that on overall it is











where household utility takes into account e®ective family size nt, which according to the OECD weights
is given by
nt = 1:67 + 0:67 £ dependent:adultst + 0:43 £ kidst
As calibrated in Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005), ® is set to 0.81 and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ½ is set to 2, which is also the value chosen in Laibson et al. (2001).
2.3.5 Interest rate and time discount rates
I follow Laibson et al. (2001) in assuming a return rate of r = 3:75% to the liquid asset. Based on this
assumption, I also draw on these authors' calibration results for the time-discount rates for households
with and without time-consistent preferences, as shown in Table 2.4. Since the discount factors for hy-
perbolics and exponentials are calibrated using the same SCF data on savings at retirement age, but




assuming ¯ = :7 for all hyperbolic households, the calibrated long-run discount rates ± are greater in
the time-inconsistent case. The observed amount of savings di®ers over education types, which suggests
di®erent rates of long run discounting for households with di®erent education levels.
2.4 Results
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the average simulation results over all education types of households, given the
share of each education type in the population. Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 separately show the simulation
results for households without completed High School education, with High School certi¯cate and with
a college degree. Clearly the pattern of durables stock and savings is robust over the di®erent education
types and income pro¯les.
2.4.1 General results
The simulation of the model predicts hyperbolic and exponential households to behave very similarly. The
same general pattern applies to all households. As explained in Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005),
durable goods play a dual role. On the one hand they provide utility, on the other hand, accumulating
durables is a form of precautionary savings and protects the household from negative income shocks.
Hence young households borrow in the ¯nancial asset in order to build up a durables stock, which then
serves as collateral for future loans, and therefore as a precautionary savings device. Simultaneously,
since the two goods are complements in the utility function, a lower durables stock reduces the marginal
utility from perishables consumption. Hence overall consumption is low when the durables stock is low;
as the durables stock grows, marginal utility derived from consumption in the perishable good increases
and both, durables holdings and consumption grow together. Together with changes in family size, this
mechanism can account for the hump shaped pattern of life-cycle expenditure observed in consumption
data. In addition, in this model the durables stock also functions as bequest, and even sustains debt for
very old households.
With respect to the role of time-inconsistency in this model, at ¯rst the result that hyperbolic and
exponential households are predicted to be observationally equivalent is surprising, especially since for
college graduates savings for hyperbolic households slightly exceed exponentials' savings (Figure 2.5).
Another point of interest is the greater volatility of the durables stock for time-inconsistent households.
2.4.2 The e®ect of the time-inconsistency
In order to explain the similarity in life-cycle pro¯les it is best to separately consider the two key di®erences
between hyperbolic and exponential households. The ¯rst di®erence is the time-inconsistency itself, in
the sense that for hyperbolic households ¯ < 1, due to their great short run impatience. The second
di®erence is the greater long run patience of the hyperbolic households since ±hyp > ±exp for all education
types.
Beginning with the e®ect of the inconsistency, the durable good reduces the impact of short-run impatience
on household saving through three channels. The durables stock not only yields utility but also serves as a
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precautionary savings device, so that households invest heavily in durables at the beginning of their lives.
Every future saving and consumption decision is made on the basis of the accumulated durables stock, so
that current utility depends less on current spending than it would if there was only a perishable good in
the model. In fact, given the decreasing marginal utilities of durables and perishables consumption, the
durables stock smooths utility over the life-cycle. Hence the scope for short-run impatience to a®ect the
savings and consumption decision is lower and the self-control problem is less pronounced. This becomes
especially important when hyperbolic households become older and when income is declining while the
number of dependent adults in the household still is large. Since family size is decreasing, the middle
aged household will not have to further invest in the durables stock, but can let it depreciate while only
spending on the perishable good. Hence she will be less tempted to prematurely consume out of her
savings, and retirement savings will be a®ected less by the self-control problem.
The other channel is that durables serve as an asset, however subject to adjustment costs and return
dominated by the ¯nancial asset. Thus the consequences of short-run impatience are less severe, since
either the household can simply spend less on the durable good in the next periods, or more importantly,
part of the expenditure on durable goods can be recovered by selling o® durables at a later date. In this
sense, hyperbolic households willing to save and consume at the same time, are able to `eat their cake
and have it'. Here also lies the explanation for the observed volatility of the hyperbolics' durables stock.
The third channel is probably the most obvious one. Introducing durables into the model reduces the need
for retirement savings in general, since it reduces consumption of the perishable good. If, however, savings
are less important, then a self-control problem preventing these savings also has less of an impact. Overall,
when durable goods are taken into account, the self-control problem is reduced to a debt-repayment
problem for young households with a growing family. Thereafter savings rates are not much a®ected.
The second key di®erence between hyperbolic and exponential households is the di®erence in long run
patience. Since the calibrated rate of long-run discounting is smaller for the hyperbolic household, they
ideally want to save more than exponential households would. The observation that, in fact, savings are
nearly identical for the two types of households independently of their income process, shows that the
self-control problem indeed reduces savings. However, given the calibrated parameter values and given
the e®ect the durable good has on the self-control problem, as well as on the role of retirement savings,
the two types of households cannot be told apart.
Returning to the modus in which the time-discount rates were calibrated in Laibson et al. (2001), it is
important to keep in mind that for both types of households the same data on wealth and savings were
used. The fact, that, given the calibrated discount factors, this model replicates the same savings and
durables pro¯les for the two types of households lends support to including durables into the life-cycle
model.
2.4.3 Robustness
In order to assess whether the result of observational equivalence is driven by the illiquidity of the durable
good, the exercise is repeated under the assumption that there are no adjustment costs for changes in the
durables stock, so that the durable good is perfectly liquid. Figures 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 show the results
for the di®erent education types. Although the spending and savings patterns remain very similar, two
things should be noted. Firstly, the volatility of the hyperbolics' durables stock has increased, since now
a revision of the durables stock is cost free and the household will give in to her short-run impatience
more easily. Secondly, at least for households with a college degree, the di®erence in savings of hyperbolic




and exponential households has increased. Since college graduates have the steepest income pro¯le, their
savings are least a®ected by the self-control problem. Also college graduates have the highest demand for
durables and hyperbolic college graduates pro¯t the most, when it is cost-free to convert their durables
into savings when family size is decreasing, i.e. \when the kids move out".
The other feature of the model which might be suspected of causing the similarity in the pro¯les of the
two types, is the collateral condition (2.6), since imposing a constraint on household borrowing could
reduce the e®ect of the self-control problem. However, Figures 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 clearly show, that the
e®ect of time-inconsistency does not change when borrowing is unconstrained. In other words, for both
types of households, debt is collateralized by the durables stock, even if the borrowing constraint is not
imposed explicitly.
2.5 Conclusion
While the results of this exercise lend great support towards the inclusion of durable goods into the
life-cycle model, they do not give any clear indication in how far the assumption of time-inconsistent
preferences is helpful. The simple reason is that the e®ect of the time-inconsistency tends to disappear
given the di®erence in long run discounting, but also the asset value of the durable good and its e®ect of
reducing the impact of the self-control problem by smoothing household expenditure.
Unlike in the case where a commitment device in form of an illiquid asset is introduced, here the self-
control problem is not solved. On the contrary, apart from its asset character, the advantage of the
durable good lies in its (comparative) liquidity. The hyperbolic household derives immediate grati¯ca-
tion from the services provided by the durable good, while simultaneously the durables stock also serves
as savings. Indeed, up to a degree, she is able to \eat her pie and have it".
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2.A Figures and Tables
The deterministic part of the income pro¯le consists of the e®ect of age on income (cubic polynomial)
and the e®ect of household size and composition.
Table 2.1: Estimated Age - Non Asset Income Pro¯les*
Less than High High School College
School Graduates Graduates
In the labor force
Age 0.077 0.118 0.223
Age2=100 -0.172 -0.201 -0.390
Age3=10000 0.092 0.081 0.204
N head&spouse 0.668 0.548 0.462
N kids 0.012 -0.033 -0.023
N dep. adults 0.167 0.170 0.022
Other e®ectsa 7.958 7.439 6.029
Retired
Age -0.039 -0.002 -0.009
N head&spouse 0.656 0.554 0.327
N kids 0.042 0.199 -0.560
N dep. adults 0.421 0.204 0.162
Other e®ectsa 9.927 8.433 10.172
*Source Laibson et al. (2001), Table 4
Includes the e®ects of a constant, cohort dummies, and the unemployment rate in the household's state
of residence
The stochastic component of the income process is expressed as a 2 stage Markov process. Depending
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Table 2.2: Estimated Age-Income Processes*
Less than High High School College
School Graduates Graduates
® 0.881 0.782 0.967
¾2 0.024 0.029 0.019
*Source Laibson et al. (2001), Table 5
where ®h and ¾2
h are the coe±cients and the estimated variance from the residuals of the above regression.
For each education group Figure 2.1 shows the deterministic component of the income pro¯le for house-
holds consisting at least of household head and spouse, and given the number of dependents as estimated
by Laibson et al. (2001) and reported in Table 2.3























Figure 2.1: Income-Age Pro¯les For The Di®erent Education Types*
* Own simulation based on parameter values estimated in Laibson et al. (2001)
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Table 2.4: Time Discount Rates*
±nHS ±HS ±Col
hyperbolics 0:930 0:956 0:956
exponentials 0:912 0:944 0:945
*Source Laibson et al. (2001)
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Household Composition*
* Source Laibson et al. (2001)













probablity of dying between periods
Figure 2.3: Probabilities of dying between periods*
* Source Life-tables, (OECD)
AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/22882.A. FIGURES AND TABLES 53











hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock
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exponential households savings, consumption and durables stock







n = 12 000
Figure 2.4: Life-cycle pro¯les for hyperbolic and exponential households
Averages over entire population
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hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison
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hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock






n = 12 000
Figure 2.5: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential households
Averages over entire population
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hyperbolic households’ savings, consumption and durables stock




















exponentials households’ savings, consumption and durables stock




















hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison





















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock







Figure 2.6: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential households
Households without completed High School education
AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/228856 CHAPTER 2. EAT YOUR PIE AND HAVE IT












hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock




















exponentials households savings, consumption and durables stock




















hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison





















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock







Figure 2.7: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential households
Households with completed High School education
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exponentials households savings, consumption and durables stock






















hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison


















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock







Figure 2.8: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential households
Households with college degree
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hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock when durables are liquid




















exponentials households savings, consumption and durables stock when durables are liquid




















hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison when durables are liquid





















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock when durables are liquid







Figure 2.9: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential households
when durables are liquid
Households without completed High School education
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hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock when durables are liquid




















exponentials households savings, consumption and durables stock when durables are liquid




















hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison when durables are liquid





















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock when durables are liquid







Figure 2.10: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential house-
holds when durables are liquid
Households with completed High School education
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hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock when durables are liquid





















exponential households savings, consumption and durables stock when durables are liquid






















hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison when durables are liquid


















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock when durables are liquid







Figure 2.11: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential house-
holds when durables are liquid
Households with college degree
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hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock
 when borrowing is unconstrained
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hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison
 when borrowing is unconstrained
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential house-
holds when borrowing is unconstrained
Households without completed High School education
AY, Judith (2008), Three Essays on Household Consumption 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/228862 CHAPTER 2. EAT YOUR PIE AND HAVE IT












hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock
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exponentials households savings, consumption and durables stock
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hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison
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Figure 2.13: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential house-
holds when borrowing is unconstrained
Households with completed High School education
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hyperbolic households savings, consumption and durables stock
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exponentials households savings, consumption and durables stock
when borrowing is unconstrained























hyperbolic and exponential household savings in comparison
when borrowing is unconstrained

















hyperbolic and exponential household durables stock
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Figure 2.14: Comparison of savings and durables stock of hyperbolic and exponential house-
holds when borrowing is unconstrained
Households with college degree
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The algorithm used to ¯nd the policy functions, is explained using a simpler version of the model,
abstracting from the collateral condition, adjustment costs, bequests, life-horizon uncertainty and from
changes in family size. From the equilibrium conditions one sees, that each period t the household solves
her maximization problem according to the current value (2.10) and the continuation value (2.11)
Wt;t(xt;Dt¡1) = max
ct;Dt
fu(ct;Dt) + ¯±EtVt;t+1(xt+1;Dt)g (2.10)
Vt;t+1(xt+1;Dt) = max
ct+1;Dt+1
fu(ct+1;Dt+1) + ±Et+1Vt+1;t+2(xt+2;Dt+1)g (2.11)
subject to the budget constraint, and taking into account sophistication. This is equivalent to solving
the problem with durables stock and savings as control variables, with the current value function
Wt;t(xt;Dt¡1) = max
at+1;Dt




fu(xt+1 ¡ at+2 ¡ dt+1;Dt+1)
+ ±Et+1Vt+1;t+2(xt+2;Dt+1)g (2.13)
where
dt = Dt ¡ (1 ¡ °)Dt¡1
xt+1 = yt+1 + Rat+1







Again sophistication implies that the household foresees the recurrence of her present-bias and knows the
future savings and durables policies given the state variables and the realization of the income shock.
In order to solve this problem numerically, I closely follow the solution method in Laibson et al. (2001),
who employ a backwards induction algorithm based on a multidimensional grid search, with a grid for
the two states each (durables and asset holdings), as well as a grid for the di®erent realizations of the
income shock. Note that the control variables in period t translate into the states in period t+1.
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The problem in period T+N
Given the No Ponzi condition that the household cannot die in debt, and given that there is no uncertainty
with respect to the life horizon, I specify the asset grid such that minimum feasible savings in period
T +N equals zero. For each level of retirement income and for each initial position on asset and durables




fu(xT+N ¡ aT+N+1=R ¡ dT+N;DT+N)g
where xT+N = yT+N + aT+N and aT+N+1 ¸ 0. Note that the grid is speci¯ed such that in period t, the
control variable for savings is at+1=R and the state variable of asset holdings in period t+1 is at+1. For
each realization of the income shock this yields a (n £ k) matrix of savings and durables policies given
the combination of state variables at the beginning of T + N.
The next step is to update the value function. For each income state the continuation value in period









The problem in period T+N-1
For each income state and for each initial level of asset and durables holdings, the household in period
T+N-1 maximizes her current value according to
WT+N¡1;T+N¡1(xT+N¡1;DT+N¡2) = max
aT+N;DT+N¡1
fu(xT+N¡1 ¡ aT+N=R ¡ dT+N¡1;DT+N¡1)
+ ¯±ET+N¡1VT+N¡1;T+N(xT+N;DT+N¡1)
where VT+N¡1;T+N(xT+N;DT+N¡1) is given by (2.14)
Again this yields a (n£k) matrix for each of the policies for the control variables at each current income
state. It also determines the realized continuation value for period T +N, V ¤
T+N¡1;T+N(xT+N;DT+N¡1);
which depends on the consumption and savings choices in period T + N ¡ 1. So far, the solution proce-
dure for the problem of the time inconsistent households is nearly identical to the standard backwards
induction algorithm for the time-consistent household. Given the policies a¤
T+N and D¤
T+N¡1; for each











Here the e®ect of time inconsistency and sophistication is clearly visible.
While the period T +N ¡1 households discount period T +N utility at rate ¯±, the household in period
T +N ¡2 discounts between period T +N ¡1 and period T +N according to the standard exponential
factor ±. Since the problem is solved by backwards induction, each self t of the household makes her
savings and consumption decisions taking into account the future policy choices and the present-bias of





The problem for periods T+N-2 to period 1
The procedure described above is repeated successively for all time periods, up to the maximization
problem of the newly born household at period 1. Given income uncertainty, at each income state the
expectation of the continuation value EtVt;t+1(xt+1;Dt) is determined by the transition probabilities from
one state into the other, conditional on the current state. As above, the continuation payo® for period
t ¡ 1 is determined by the solution to period t households maximization problem, re°ecting the idea of
the intrapersonal game played by the di®erent selves. Overall, the algorithm yields T + N £ m matrices
of size (n £ k) for each control variable, where m is the number of states in the income process.
General Comments
Since the algorithm is based on a grid search there is a trade-o® between accuracy on the one hand and
time and storage space saving on the other. Furthermore, due to the time-inconsistency of preferences,
the results are sensitive to the ¯neness of the grid and the minimum value of the asset grid has to be large
and negative. Since the grid has to be ¯ne unless it biases the results of the intrapersonal Markov game,
computation time can be reduced only by reducing the number of search iterations in each period, which
is done by restricting search to those values of the asset grid which lie within a reasonable radius from
the preceding policy function. Hence the search range in period t is determined by the policy functions
chosen in period t + 1. For a large enough search radius this works well since households smooth utility
over periods.
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This study presents some empirical ¯ndings on the e®ect of children on household expen-
diture in the United States. Estimates from a regression and a propensity score matching
exercise using US CEx data show that the e®ect of children on household expenditure
strongly di®ers for households with di®erent income pro¯les. For households with a college
degree, and, also to some extent for High School graduates, children substantially a®ect the
level of total household expenditure, as was to be expected from economic theory. How-
ever, for households without a High School degree, children do not seem to increase total
expenditure. The lack of sensitivity of consumption to household size implies that there are
strong liquidity constraints for low income households and raises welfare concerns. Also, for
welfare analysis the result indicates an additional, permanent source of inequality between
households.
JEL classi¯cation: D13 D63 E21 I31 I32 J13
Keywords: Household Consumption, Equivalence Scales, Children, Welfare, Inequality
I would like to thank Salvador Ortigueira and Morten Ravn for their help and supervision. I am also
grateful for comments and support to Ghazala Azmat and Harald Fadinger, and to Andrea Ichino and
Sascha Becker for making available their algorithms for propensity score matching. All errors, of course,
are mine.
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3.1 Introduction
Even before children enter college and parents have to pay tuition fees, children are expensive. Or, to
be more precise, children are expensive, if parents can a®ord to spend money on them. This may not
always be the case and the aim of this paper is to see, whether overall household expenditure is a®ected
di®erently by children for households of di®erent income categories.
The motivation for addressing this issue in a macroeconomic context is threefold. Firstly, the presence of
children a®ects consumption patterns over the life-cycle. However, life-cycle literature usually abstracts
from within-household decision making and the impact of changes in family size usually is treated in
a uniform way for all types of households. Secondly research on inequality implicitly assumes that the
impact of children on household expenditure is - at least proportionately - the same for all income groups.
This means that, so far, household size is not a criterion in the macroeconomic analysis of welfare or
consumption inequality. Thirdly, if it is found that liquidity constraints severely restrict some households'
ability to react to an increase in family size for increasing expenditure, this strongly points at very low
savings or binding borrowing constraints for low income households. Also, to the best of my knowledge,
as yet the impact of family size on savings and consumption, and hence on consumption smoothing, so
far has not been addressed in macroeconomics.
When assessing inequality or investigating household consumption, macroeconomic theory broadly dis-
tinguishes between three types of income pro¯le, determined by the highest level of education reached
by a household. Apart from di®erently calibrated parameter values and income pro¯les, these groups
are assumed to behave according to the same rules. However, macroeconomic studies on inequality com-
monly do not speci¯cally account for demographic characteristics of households. Nevertheless, it is a
very strong, albeit implicit, assumption that the response of household consumption to an increase in
the number of household members should follow the same rules, independently of the household's income
pro¯le. This, however, does not necessarily hold true.
In order to investigate this issue, a very simple model on household expenditure is estimated on the
basis of U. S. Consumer Expenditure Survey data. The results from this estimation indicate that for
households with a college degree (and the corresponding income process) household expenditure reacts
strongly to the presence of children in the household. To a slightly less extent, this also holds for house-
holds with completed High School education. For households without a High School degree, the response
of expenditure to children is substantially less pronounced. These ¯ndings are recon¯rmed in a propensity
score matching exercise, which shows that indeed for the households with the lowest income pro¯le, the
average treatment e®ect of children on total expenditure for households with children is not signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. The result holds independently of the number of children.
This ¯nding does not only suggest that demographic characteristics should be taken into account when in-
terpreting observations and estimates on consumption inequality, it also hints at strong budget constraints
for low income households. In particular regarding rising inequality, the group for which household in-
come has not increased on real terms over the last decades, is also the group whose overall household
expenditure does not increase with the presence of children. As a consequence children from low income
households will be further disadvantaged by rising inequality. This observation alone raises severe welfare
concerns.
Section 2 gives a short summary on equivalence scales and on research on intra-household allocation of re-
sources, and explains how family size commonly is accounted for in macroeconomics. Section 3 describes
the data set used in this study, and Section 4 explains the model to be estimated. Section 5 presents the
results from a OLS regression and from a propensity score matching exercise. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
Household size and household composition a®ect household expenditure and consumption patters. Nev-
ertheless, it is very di±cult to establish a causal relationship, since intra-household decisions are barely
observable for the researcher.
Microeconomic theory addresses the e®ect of children on household welfare, or the `costs' of children. Al-
though there is a richness in frameworks addressing the impact of children on demand, they usually rest
on restrictive assumptions. Also, if the e®ect of children on labor supply is not accounted for, estimates
of the e®ect of children on consumption are likely to be biased (Browning, 1992).
In order to capture the cost of children, the e®ect of household size on consumption and household welfare
is often expressed in equivalence scales. Equivalence scales themselves go back to estimates of physical
requirements and the estimation of \what households could consume, rather than on actual household
behavior" (Nelson, 1993). They were originally calculated in the 1960ies in order to allow conclusions on
the additional amount of income that could equalize consumption of essential goods per scaled household
member in poor households of di®erent sizes. Equivalence scales, however, do not take into account
that households with children may have di®erent dynamics altogether, i.e. that they have a demand for
di®erent goods, and that they may have di®erent preference structures.
Table 3.1 shows examples of di®erent equivalence scales. The scales in the ¯rst row go back to the
empirical estimates from a demand system analysis in Phibbs (1998). The other two rows are o±cial
equivalence scales, which are recommended for the use in poverty analysis. It is worth noting that the
equivalence scales from the U.S. Department of Commerce explicitly take into account scale e®ects in
household consumption. The equivalence scales should re°ect the `cost of children' for poor households
and denote the additional amount of income a household would have to receive in order to arrive at the
same welfare level per household member as a comparable childless household.
Table 3.1: Examples for Equivalence Scales
Family Type: couple with 0 children 1 child 2 children 3 children
Phibbs (1998) - Canada 1 1.16 1.28 1.38
OECD(modi¯ed) - unspeci¯ed 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4
U.S Dept. of Commerce - U.S. ¤¤ 1.68 2.11 2.50 2.88
¤¤Formula: (adults + 0:7 ¤ kids)
0:75
Another important issue concerns decision making within households. While in macroeconomic models,
household utility is assumed to be maximized for the household as a whole, microeconomic theory makes
a distinction between the di®erent members' utility and allows for di®erent preferences of household
members. Also the decision power within the household can be concentrated in the household head or
be distributed among members. In the analysis of intra household decision making, economists usually
distinguish between public (within the household) and private goods.
Di®erent empirical studies have tried to distinguish between two extreme scenarios. The ¯rst one is the
case where only the household head's utility is taken into account, so that in fact there is substitution of
resources away from the other household members and towards consumption of the household head. The
other possibility is a scenario where all member's utility is maximized equally or according to weights.
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This is either due to perfect altruism of the decision making household head, or due to sharing of decision
making power. Consequently intra-household decision making can be a cooperative process which also is
determined by the distribution of resources within a household.
Browning and Chiappori (1998) ¯nd empirical support that for couples household decisions are made
in a collective setting. Utility theory applies to each household member and decisions on the household
level are made collectively and are Pareto e±cient. Also on the basis of this ¯nding Lise and Seitz (2004)
show that intra-household decision is determined by bargaining power within the household. This is
important, since the use of equivalence scales for adults would be valid for the determination of adult
consumption only if households pool their income on an equal level. Indeed, the authors arrive at the
conclusion that between 1968 and 2001 in the United Kingdom within-household consumption inequality
has been decreasing partly because female labor income has been increasing steadily. Given that children
have zero income, their position in the collective setting is very weak.
In macroeconomics there are two areas of research for which intra-households demographics can have
particularly strong implications: life-cycle analysis and empirical work on welfare inequality.
For once, a household's optimum consumption decisions strongly vary over the life cycle. From an empir-
ical perspective household age and household composition are strongly correlated, so that it is di±cult to
separate the e®ect of life-cycle factors from the e®ect of children. Also the expectation of future fertility
can be an important driving force behind current consumption and savings patters, but remains entirely
unobserved. In addition, household decomposition often is endogenous, since the decision to have children
is consciously made.
The key assumption in the life-cycle framework is that households smooth consumption over periods as to
keep the marginal utility of wealth constant as speci¯ed by Friedman (Friedman, 1957). However, there
is no consensus how household utility is to be speci¯ed, and a common assumption is that consumption
and labor supply are additively separable in the utility function, while there is no standard way to include
demographics. As Blundell et al. (1994) ¯nd, this approach can be quite misleading, since it implies that
household consumption is decided on independently of labor supply and demographics characteristics.
Along the same lines, in the past a main criticism of the life-cycle model has been that - in its simple
speci¯cation - it is not able to replicate the empirically observed hump-shaped consumption pro¯le. More
recently, technological progress has allowed to move beyond certainty equivalence and perfect foresight,
towards a more realistic treatment of uncertainty, and a replicated life-cycle consumption pro¯les have
come closer to observed patterns. Importantly, however, Attanasio et al. (1999) show that demographic
factors can improve the performance of the life-cycle model remarkably, even if certainty equivalence and
perfect foresight still are assumed. They ¯nd that when the discount factor is estimated empirically, it
strongly grows with household size. As a result, simulated household consumption is high when household
size peaks, even if family size does not directly enter the utility function.
Independently of the speci¯cation of the household problem, it is a ¯xed feature of the life-cycle literature
that the decision making body is the household per se, and that no distinction is made between di®erent
members. While family size may enter the part of the utility function concerning consumption (since
preferences usually are assumed to be additively separable), as in Laibson et al. (2001), usually this
only is done in order to re°ect that larger households consume more. Depending on the weights given
to household size, there is room for economies of scale of consumption within the household, even if
consumption (at least of perishable goods) is considered partly private. Nevertheless, the question which
household members decide on consumption is not addressed, also the allocation of consumption between
the di®erent household members is assumed stable and the same for all households. Consequently, while
household size can drive total household expenditure on an 'ad hoc basis', equal allocation of consumption
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within the household is presumed rather than resting on theoretical or empirical foundations.
The second ¯eld of macroeconomic research for which household size and composition could matter is
welfare and inequality analysis. In order to learn about household welfare, household expenditure is
used as a proxy for consumption. Given that households are assumed to smooth consumption, expen-
diture is considered to better re°ect expectations life-time resources that current income does (Blundell
and Preston, 1998). Volatility in expenditure also allows for conclusions on insurance towards income
shocks. Blundell and Preston (1998) assess the reliability of consumption as a measure of welfare, and
¯nd that consumption volatility can serve as a measure for welfare inequality within cohorts, but that
across cohorts comparison is problematic, since inequality increases with age. Taking this into account,
the authors ¯nd a strong increase in short term income uncertainty in Great Britain during the 1980ies.
Nevertheless income inequality has increased faster than consumption inequality.
In welfare analysis, a very straight forward strategy of dealing with households of di®erent size and com-
position is to concentrate on consumption per capita within a household. In order to capture economies
of scales, consumption per capita is calculated on the basis of equivalence scales, where economies of scale
mainly result from shared consumption of a public good. The use of equivalence scales also is conform to
the idea of all household members' utility being accounted for in the consumption decision, so that the
objective is to e®ectively neutralize household composition and household size as household characteris-
tics. After this adjustment, direct comparison of the welfare of members of households of di®erent sizes
is possible.
This technique has also been used in Blundell and Preston (1998) in their assessment of the evolution of
inequality in Great Britain. Other prominent examples where equivalence scales have been use to facil-
itate comparison of welfare of households of di®erent sizes are Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Krueger
and Perri (2006).
Deaton and Paxson (1994) investigate whether, within age cohorts, the increase in inequality over life-
time, as predicted by the Permanent Income Hypothesis is observed in consumption data for Great
Britain the United States and Taiwan. The authors recognize that household composition and structure
change over the life-cycle, but ¯nd that any alternative to specifying consumption at the household level
would be arbitrary. Consequently the authors compare their results for consumption dispersion for the
household level and for adult equivalents. In both cases, for the three countries the empirical results
support the Permanent Income Hypothesis. However, the e®ect of dispersion of family size on dispersion
of consumption is very strong in Taiwan, but very small in the United States.
Krueger and Perri (2006) compare the evolution of income and consumption inequality in the United
States on the basis of CEx data for the period between 1980-2003. The authors distinguish `between-
group' and `within-group' inequality, where households are divided into groups according to education,
sex and race. Again equivalence scales are used in order to eliminate the e®ect of household size on
consumption inequality across households. The key ¯nding is that within those groups, consumption
inequality has increased a lot less that income inequality. Between-group inequality in consumption,
however, closely tracks income inequality. An explanation is that while idiosyncratic income inequality
has increased, ¯nancial markets now allow households to insure against income °uctuations. This hy-
pothesis also is supported by the observation that consumer credit and income inequality both show a
very similar upwards trend.
This result is contradicted in Gorbachev (2007), where PSID data on food expenditure are used to in-
vestigate consumption inequality in the United States between 1970 and 2002. After taking into account
changes in interest rates and household composition, there is evidence that volatility in food consumption
has increased over the sample period and that inequality has increased especially among disadvantaged
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households. Those households are also those most likely to be unable to smooth consumption over tran-
sitory income shocks.
Studying inequality in a life-cycle context, Kaplan (2007) evaluates the life-cycle model along various
dimensions of inequality using structural estimation techniques on the basis of the PSID and the CEx
data sets. Here, welfare is assumed to be determined not only by consumption but also by labor supply
decisions, making the the analysis of welfare inequality more complex. While this very rich paper does
not investigate the evolution of inequality within income cohorts, it illustrates that for welfare inequality
over the entire life-cycle, shocks after the entry into the labor market have a similar impact as di®erences
in initial human wealth. Nevertheless, since equivalence scales are used in order to control for di®erences
in family size, the e®ect of children on inequality - either directly a®ecting welfare via consumption, or
indirectly via labor supply decisions -, remains unexplored.
Welfare inequality also is closely related to the issue of poverty. In context of the present study, it is
child poverty that carries particular weight. In the United States, poverty is measured in absolute levels,
and a national poverty standard is used which has been kept ¯x in real terms since the late 1960ies.
Consequently changes in inequality are not necessarily re°ected by o±cial poverty rates, as described in
Dickens and Ellwood (2003). On the Background of rising income inequality in the United States, an
increase in relative poverty may not even be captured in o±cial statistics on child poverty. Since child
poverty is measured in terms of parents' income, it is not only essential to learn how income inequal-
ity is translates into consumption inequality, but also whether households expenditure can react to the
presence of children. If liquidity constraints prevent poor households from increasing their expenditure
even if family size increases, then this is a clear indicator for child poverty, irrespectively of any o±cial
benchmark de¯ned by parent's income.
3.3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the fmly ¯les of the CEx Data set, covering 20 years from 1986 to
2005. The data source are interviews with US households, conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Ideally, each quarter, the households report information of family characteristics, income and quarterly
expenditures in ¯ve consecutive interviews. The advantages of this data set are that the expenditure
data are very detailed, and that there is a wide range of information on household composition and other
characteristics. A shortcoming is that all household information is self-reported, and hence subject to
moral hazard and issues of misspeci¯cation. Furthermore the short span of coverage for each household
reduces makes intertemporal analysis di±cult and often necessitates the construction of pseudo-panels
with all their shortcomings. While expenditure and income are originally reported at their nominal level,
in this paper the increase in consumer prices has been taken into account and expenditure and income are
converted to 1984 USD, on the basis of the CPI. Only data of households reporting to all ¯ve consecutive
interviews is taken into account.
Also in the following only households under 65 years and with an after tax income above the minimum
wage1 and below USD 200.000 are included.
All household members younger than 18 years are considered children, and the maximum number of
children is restricted to three.
The measure of expenditure in this paper does not contain expenditure on any goods and services related
1The annual minimum wage is roughly calculated by taking the US. Fed minimum hourly wage of USD 5.15,
multiplied by 40 (weekly hours), and then by 50 (working weeks).




to education. This is mainly due to expenses on education like tuition and school fees being strongly
dependent on the age of children. Furthermore tuition fees, and expenditure on education in general,
can not necessarily be compared to other expenditure on consumption goods. Another reason for this
decision is that expenditure on education is very heterogenous and likely to be highly correlated with
household income.
3.4 Model
The model assumes that household expenditure is determined by household income, age of the household
head, race, the number of grownups present in the household, the number of children, and the household
head being single or part of a couple. This is formulated in a linear regression model, where logs are





















9yeari + ui (3.1)
where j = fnHS;HS;Colg.
The households are separated into education categories, since education is considered the main determi-
nant for the household's income process. Regarding the dummy variables, if the household head is white,
race = 1, and if the household head is black race = 2. If the household head is single, couple = 1, if the
household head is part of a couple, couple = 2.
This model of course is a very simple formulation of the relationship between household expenditure and
demographic characteristics. Therefore the results should not be interpreted beyond their descriptive
value. In this sense the main message of the regression results will be, whether overall household expen-
diture is a®ected di®erently by children for households of di®erent income categories.
The main reason for this limitation is that it is reasonable to assume that the fertility decision is cor-
related with age and income, and also with the household head being part of a couple or being single.
Consequently, while endogeneity of the explanatory variable maybe less of a problem, strong causal re-
lationships between the explanatory variables are possible. This calls for caution regarding a causal
interpretation of the coe±cients. Consequently it is not within the scope of this analysis to establish a
clear causal link between children and household expenditure.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Estimation Results of the Model
Table 3.2 shows the OLS results for the estimated model. Nearly all explanatory variables are highly
signi¯cant. Only the year of the observation does not have any signi¯cant e®ect on expenditure. The
negative coe±cient for the household cohort shows that older cohorts have greater expenditure, and
might capture additional age-group e®ects. What is striking is that the e®ect of children on household
expenditure increases substantially with the education of the household head. Indeed, the e®ect of
children on household log expenditure for households with a college educated head is roughly three times
as large as for households, where the household head does not hold a high school certi¯cate. Given the
semi-log formulation of the model, this is equivalent to saying that household expenditure grows three
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time faster with each child for college educated households than for households without High School
degree, and two times faster when the household head completed his High School education.
The results clearly show that the household's income process has a strong e®ect on how household
consumption - and hence welfare - adjust to the presence of children. This hints at important liquidity
constraints for the group of households with the lowest income.
Of course it is not observable how children a®ect consumption within the household itself. Also it
is very likely that households substitute a larger number of cheaper goods for more expensive ones
when liquidity constraints are binding. Often there are also scale e®ects if goods can be shared among
household members. Nevertheless, as the theory of equivalence scales indicates, all household members
are worse of if overall household expenditure cannot adequately increase with the number of household
members. Alternatively, depending on the intra-household allocation of resources, there can be substantial
substitution of consumption from children to parents. From a policy perspective, viewed from any of
those two angles, the results described above raise severe welfare concerns.
3.5.2 Matching Exercise
Given the fact that the data analyzed are very heterogeneous, the results from the above estimation
are more closely examined in a matching exercise. In order to account for at least some of the possible
correlation between the explanatory variables, in particular between the number of children, age and
income, I use the propensity score matching technique developed by Andrea Ichino and Sascha Becker for
the estimation of Average Treatment E®ects on the Treated (ATT). This technique has been originally
designed in order to reduce the selection bias, which is problematic in the estimation of treatment e®ects.
The matching method compares the outcomes for treated subjects with the outcomes of a control group.
Importantly, based on their observable characteristics, subjects of the treatment and control group are
allocated in clusters. Within each cluster subjects of both group have approximately the same probability
of undergoing the treatment.
In the current framework, this translates into estimating the e®ect of children on household expendi-
ture by comparing expenditure of households with children to households which are very similar in all
characteristics but are childless. Given that in this case there are 3 di®erent treatments, namely one
child, two children or three children in the household, all three treatment situations have to be separately
compared to the control group of childless households. The propensity score, as de¯ned by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) is the conditional probability of receiving the treatment given the pre-treatment char-
acteristics, where D = f0;1;2;3g is the indicator for exposure to the di®erent treatments, and X the
multidimensional vector of pretreatment characteristics.
pg(X) ´ PrfD = g j Xg = EfX j Xg
where g = f1;2;3g.
For each education group, and as explained in Becker and Ichino (2001), the Average Treatment E®ect
on the Treated (ATT) of the "treatment" children on expenditure Y, is estimated as follows
ATTg ´ EfYgi ¡ Y0i j Di = gg
= EfEfYgi ¡ Y0i j Di = g;p(Xi)gg
= EfEfYgi j Di = g;p(Xi)g ¡ EfY0i j Di = 0;p(Xi)g j Di = gg




In order to allow for e±cient matching, the sample is narrowed down to a subsample. Only white
households with household head and spouse, and without any additional grownups are compared. Also
excluded are households who derive means from other sources than income. In order to allow for a better
comparison, and also due to demographic reasons, the household age is restricted to above 23 and below
55 (65 for households with college education and 3 children). Also, there is an upper bound to household
income, to further ensure comparability 2. It should be noted that in the following the levels e®ects on
expenditure are compared, so that the coe±cients show the absolute e®ects of the explanatory variables.
3.5.3 Results from the Matching Exercise
The results from this matching exercise are are shown in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 for households with
respectively, no High School certi¯cate, completed High School education, and a college degree. Four
di®erent standard estimation techniques are used and mostly the results for the di®erent estimator are
rather similar. For households with un¯nished High School education, the ATTs in Table 3.3 are not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, independently of the estimation technique and the number of children
assigned as treatment. Compared with comparable childless households, neither one child, nor two, nor
three children increase household expenditure. This is a very strong result and in line with the welfare
concerns mentioned above. The result further implies that High School drop outs are not able to save or
borrow due to liquidity constraints imposed by their low income, since otherwise expenditure could react
to changes in household size. Consequently this group of households is likely to be particularly vulnerable
to negative income shocks. This observation also is in line with the result in Gorbachev (2007) which
points to greater inequality in consumption between poorly educated households.
As Table 3.4 shows, for households with a High School degree, expenditure increases when there are
children, although the increase is greater when the household has two children, than when there are three
children. Applying the idea of equivalence scales to this group of households, household members in
households with three children should be worse o®, than in households with only two children. This may
in part be explained by endogenous decisions on labor supply. While only households with household head
and spouse are analyzed, in households with three children there might be a strong motive for one parent
to stay at home, which overall reduces household earnings. This could somewhat reduce expenditure, as
compared to households with only two children.
When the household head holds a college certi¯cate, the reaction of expenditure is most striking, as
seen from Table 3.5. Household expenditure steadily increases with the number of children. College
educated households seem the only ones where the welfare (in consumption terms) of the individual
household members is not a®ected by an increase in the number of children. It appears that this group
of households is the only group not to be substantially constrained by illiquidity.
The results are summarized in Figure 3.1, where the Kernel estimates for the ATTs are compared with
each other for households with High School certi¯cate and college degree. Since the ATTs for households
without completed High School education are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, they are not included
in the graph.
Of course, this exercise focuses rather on di®erences in sensitivity of expenditure to children, than on
establishing actual level e®ects. For the latter, even after the sorting into propensity scores, the sample
2For households without High School degree, maximum annual income after tax is 65 000 USD, for households
with a High School degree maximum income is 75 000 USD and when the household head holds a college degree
maximum income is restricted to USD 85 000.
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still is far too heterogeneous, which also is re°ected in the relatively high standard errors.
The real message of these results is the following. Abstracting from the direct e®ect of children on parents's
happiness, in terms of consumption per household member, households with children are clearly worse
o® than households without children, if consumption cannot increase adequately with family size. In
macroeconomic data analysis family size is controlled for by applying equivalence scales to households of
di®erent sizes, which have di®erent per capita levels of welfare even at the same income and at similar
levels of expenditure (the very concept of equivalence scales). Provided that the chosen equivalence scale
is suitable, this correctly re°ects welfare inequality between representative members of households of
di®erent sizes, but does not attribute it to its actual source. In welfare analysis, the consequence is that
part of the observed inequality in scaled per capita consumption is not due to income inequality, or income
volatility, depending on the framework of analysis. This, however, should not be (positively) interpreted
as greater consumption smoothing across transitive income shocks, or as overall lower inequality. To
the contrary, it means that a considerable amount of inequality between households with and without
children is inherent in the permanent income component. And, given the results above, the negative
e®ect of children on household welfare is much greater for households with lower permanent income than
for households in the high income brackets. In other words, a great part of welfare inequality among the
poor, but also within the lower middle class, is attributable to di®erences in the number of mouths to feed
and in strong liquidity constraints on how this can be done. Consequently it is unrelated to transitory
consumption smoothing and also cannot be alleviated by improving the performance of ¯nancial markets
for consumer credit.
3.6 Conclusion
From the above exercise it is clear that the response of household consumption to an increase in the num-
ber of household members strongly depends on on the household' income pro¯le. For life-cycle analysis
this has the implication, that taking into account family size demands a very careful approach. Regarding
welfare inequality the following issues are of importance.
Firstly, assessing welfare across households while controlling for di®erences in household size by using
equivalence scales, still yields very valuable results. Nevertheless, when, for example, welfare inequality
is investigated, part of the di®erences in variety of consumption across di®erent income groups will be
due to di®erences in the e®ect of household size on overall household consumption. While this correctly
re°ects di®erences in welfare, the link between consumption or liquidity constraints and household size
is not longer recognizable as an additional source of inequality.
Secondly the results raise concrete welfare concerns. The observation that for low-income households
expenditure hardly reacts to the presence of children strongly hints at binding liquidity constraints. Con-
sequently it is very likely that for those households precautionary and life-cycle savings are restricted
by low income. This issue demands closer investigation, since it would mean that irrespectively of the
presence of children, low income households are extremely vulnerable to income shocks. In addition, if
low income is re°ected in minimum expenditure on children, then this is a strong argument for increased
child support of low income families with children. This holds true especially in the light of growing
income inequality in the US, and given the observation that real wages for low income workers have
hardly increased in the last twenty years.
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3.A Figures and Tables
Table 3.2: OLS estimation results
no High School certi¯cate High School certi¯cate College degree
constant 4:3222¤¢¤¤ 4:6433¤¢¤¤ 4:8985¤¢¤¤
(0.1436) (0.0662) (0.0847)
®1 0:5057¤¢¤¤ 0:4840¤¢¤¤ 0:4265¤¢¤¤
(0.0078) (0.0037) (0.0049)
®2 :0122¤¢¤¤ 0:0138¤¢¤¤ 0:0266¤¢¤¤
(0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0027)
®3 ¡:0002¤¢¤¤ ¡0:0002¤¢¤¤ ¡0:0003¤¢¤¤
(0.00004) (0.00002) 0.00003
®4 ¡0:017¤ ¡0:0528¤¢¤¤ ¡0:0445¤¢¤¤
(0.0069) (0.0035) (0.004)
®5 0:0613¤¢¤¤ 0:0679¤¢¤¤ 0:0686¤¢¤¤
(0.0054) (0.0033) (0.0054)
®6 0:0139¤¢¤¤ 0:0259¤¢¤¤ 0:0395¤¢¤¤
(0.0038) (0.0021) (0.0031)
®7 0:2233¤¢¤¤ 0:2058¤¢¤¤ 0:2352¤¢¤¤
(0.0114) 0.0054 (0.0076)
®8 ¡0:0336¤¢¤¤ ¡0:0260¤¢¤¤ ¡0:0356¤¢¤¤
(0.0080) (0.0038) (0.0051)
®9 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.000004
(0.00005) (0.00002) (0.00002)
R2 0.5653 0.5518 0.5187
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Table 3.3: No High School Certi¯cate - Average e®ect of Treatment on Treated
ATT 1 child 2 children 3 children
nearest neighbor -0.722 1.307 -0.547
(1.235) (1.182) (1.174)
radius matching -0.142 -0.125 -0.793
(-0.837) (0.733) (0.721)
kernel matching -0.034 0.076 -0.490
(0.710) (0.715) (0.776)
strati¯cation -0.066 0.114 -0.365
(0.864) (0.894) (0.916)
in thousand USD
¤ signi¯cant at 10 % level, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5% level
Table 3.4: High School Certi¯cate - Average e®ect of Treatment on Treated
ATT 1 child 2 children 3 children
nearest neighbor 1:345¤:¤¤ 2:198¤:¤¤ 0.747
(0.520) (0.475) (0.683)
radius matching 0.687 1:442¤:¤¤ 0:875¤
(0.333) (0.334) (0.363)
kernel matching 0.625 1:514¤:¤¤ 1:021¤:¤¤
(0.302) (0.327) (0.361)
strati¯cation 0.689 1:445¤:¤¤ 1:378¤:¤¤
(0.361) (0.343) (0.471)
in thousand USD
¤ signi¯cant at 10 % level, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5 % level
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Table 3.5: College degree - Average e®ect of Treatment on Treated
ATT 1 child 2 children 3 children
nearest neighbor 1.584 2:199¤:¤¤ 1.845
(0.883) (0.729) (1.141)
radius matching 1:359¤ 2:487¤:¤¤ 3:312¤:¤¤
(0.554) (0.552) (0.659)
kernel matching 1:438¤ 2:479¤:¤¤ 3:362¤:¤¤
(0.561) (0.552) (0.742)
strati¯cation 1:592¤ 2:572¤:¤¤ 3:726¤:¤¤
(0.630) (0.596) (0.741)
in thousand USD
¤ signi¯cant at 10 % level, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5 % level































Figure 3.1: Comparison of ATTs, for households with college and High School education:
Kernel estimators
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